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THE EXXON VALDEZ CASE AND 
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BY JEFFREY L. FISHER* 
ABSTRACT 
     In this Article, the Author discusses the implications of the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker for the Court’s 
ongoing punitive damages jurisprudence, as well as for the Constitution’s 
regulation of punishment more generally. The Exxon decision reveals that, 
notwithstanding modern rhetoric decrying supposedly “skyrocketing” 
punitive damages awards, the Court is troubled by the common law system of 
awarding punitive damages not so much because of the size of awards it 
allows as because of such awards’ perceived unpredictability. From this 
insight, the Author argues that the Court’s concerns about large punitive 
damage awards are therefore essentially procedural, not substantive, in 
nature. That is, the Court’s current concerns over punitive damages mirror 
criticisms levied a generation ago against systems of criminal sentencing that 
generated vast and unjustified disparities in punishment. The constitutional 
imperative, now as then, is to regularize punishment. But that is all, the 
Author contends, that the Constitution really requires: once legislatures step 
into the breach and set to regulating punitive damages, the Court should 
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 *  Associate Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. I have served as 
counsel to the mandatory punitive damages class in the Exxon Valdez case for 
several years, and I argued their case in the Supreme Court. Although my 
thinking on the subjects described here has benefitted greatly from my 
collaboration in that case with a team of wonderful and dedicated lawyers, the 
opinions expressed here are strictly my own and do not speak for any other 
members of the Exxon Valdez legal team or the plaintiffs themselves. I also am 
grateful to Pam Karlan, Larry Marshall, Cathy Sharkey, and Bob Weisberg for 
reading earlier drafts and for providing extremely helpful feedback. 
  One further note of explanation concerning my involvement in the Exxon 
case: Because I believe deeply in the plaintiffs’ cause, it would be easy for me to 
use this forum to pen a jeremiad criticizing all that I think was wrong or unfair 
concerning the Court’s resolution of the case—particularly the Court’s ultimate 
judgment that there was nothing unusually reprehensible about Exxon’s 
conduct. But I have decided not to do that. Rather, I seek to understand the 
Court’s decision on its own terms. My hope is that elucidating the Court’s 
reasoning will provide legislatures, organizations, and citizens interested in 
preserving the availability of stiff punitive damages in appropriate future cases 
with an understanding of how to go about doing that. 
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defer to legislatures’ policy goals and chosen means of effectuating them. In 
particular, if a legislature decides to gives its democratic imprimatur to large 
punitive awards, the Court should accede to such determinations in the same 
way it regularly accedes to legislative determinations dictating exceptionally 
severe criminal punishment. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................2 
I. LEGAL ORIGINS OF, AND MODERN RESTRICTIONS ON, PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES ................................................................................................8 
A. Background ....................................................................................8 
B. The Supreme Court’s Development of Restrictions on 
Punitive Awards ..........................................................................10 
II. THE EXXON CASE..................................................................................13 
III. COMPARING PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO CRIMINAL SENTENCING ..........16 
A. Sentencing Guidelines.................................................................17 
B. Modern Capital Punishment Law .............................................20 
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALLY REGULARIZING 
PUNISHMENT.........................................................................................24 
A. Punitive Damages........................................................................25 
1. Encouraging Democratic Development of Law .......................26 
2. Pursuing Varied State Interests...............................................30 
3. Establishing Maximum Punishments......................................35 
B. Criminal Sentencing ....................................................................43 
CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................46 
 
INTRODUCTION 
At last, we arrive at the root of the problem. 
We have known for roughly two decades that the Supreme Court is 
troubled by the modern, common-law system of awarding punitive 
damages.1 After grumbling about increasingly large punitive awards in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Court has invoked the Due Process 
Clause in four cases over the past twelve years to strike down a series of 
 
 1. By “common-law system of punitive damages,” I mean the system under 
which juries may award punitive damages in tort cases in order to punish and 
deter certain kinds of reprehensible behavior and face no statutory constraints 
with respect to the amount they may award. See infra notes 26–30. 
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multi-million dollar awards.2 But the Court has been rather imprecise 
about what exactly is problematic about the common-law system for 
awarding punitive damages. At times, the Court has described 
unconstitutional awards as “grossly excessive,”3 or disproportionate, 
with respect to the defendant’s conduct.4 At others, it has derided 
punitive awards as “arbitrary”5 and faulted the “imprecise” and 
“discretion[ary]” manner6 in which they were administered.7 In other 
words, the Court has vacillated concerning the basic issue of whether 
the problem plaguing the common-law system of awarding punitive 
damages is substantive or procedural in nature (or some combination of 
both). 
The stakes of this conceptualization are high. If the problem with 
the modern system of awarding punitive damages is a substantive one, 
then the Court’s holdings mean that the Due Process Clause in any 
given case flatly forbids a jury from imposing punitive damages above a 
given level—apparently some low-level multiple of the underlying 
compensatory damages—no matter how much notice the defendant 
received that a bigger award was possible or how fair the trial was. But 
if the problem with the modern system of awarding punitive damages is 
essentially a procedural one, then the Court’s holdings mean that 
legislatures and courts could allow punitive damages far in excess of 
low-single-digit ratios so long as the governing law provides fair notice, 
the court gives clear jury instructions, and related rules of fair play are 
followed. 
The Supreme Court’s decision to review the $5 billion punitive 
damages award arising from the notorious Exxon Valdez oil spill—
reduced to $2.5 billion by the Ninth Circuit—offered the prospect that 
the Court would finally pin down the conceptual basis for exerting 
serious appellate review over punitive damages. Exxon’s challenge to 
the award, which was roughly five times the plaintiffs’ compensatory 
recoveries, was largely substantive in nature.8 And the trial in the case 
 
 2. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007); State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman 
Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001); BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 3. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417; Cooper, 532 U.S. at 434; BMW, 517 U.S. at 574. 
 4. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 434; BMW, 517 U.S. at 575. 
 5. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 351; State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416. 
 6. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417. 
 7. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 352; State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416. 
 8. One of Exxon’s arguments—that the jury was inappropriately allowed to 
consider its wealth—was procedural in character. See Brief for Petitioner at 55–
56, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (No. 07-219). But the 
Court ultimately declined to address the argument. See generally Exxon Shipping 
Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008). 
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had been managed to avoid various procedural pitfalls: the trial court 
created a “mandatory punitive damages class” to avoid the prospect of 
double punishment; the trial court made sure that the jury did not hear 
any evidence concerning Exxon’s actions in other jurisdictions or 
respecting anyone besides the plaintiff class; and the trial court gave the 
jury “unusually detailed” instructions to guide the jury’s discretion in 
calibrating any punitive award to what it determined to be the nature of 
Exxon’s wrongdoing.9 Finally, there was reason to expect a clear 
theoretical explication from the Supreme Court because the case was 
grounded in maritime law—a form of federal common law. This legal 
framework rendered the Supreme Court more free than in purely 
constitutional cases arising from state-court judgments to reveal and to 
implement its own policy preferences concerning “the desirability of 
regulating [punitive damages] as a common law remedy.”10 
The result in Exxon seems to reinforce the prevailing view that the 
Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence has a robust substantive 
component.11 The Court reduced the award from roughly $2.5 billion to 
$500 million, or from a five-to-one ratio to compensatory damages to a 
one-to-one ratio.12 The business bar already is propounding the decision 
as a substantive decision, suggesting that the Constitution limits 
punitive awards to a one-to-one ratio of compensatory damages, at least 
when such damages are substantial and the conduct giving rise to the 
award is something short of extraordinarily reprehensible.13 
 
 9. In re the Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1080–82 (D. Alaska 2004). 
 10. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2626–27. 
 11. For examples of scholarly pieces before Exxon claiming that this 
jurisprudence was substantive in nature, see Erwin Chemerinsky, The 
Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1056–57 (2004); Samuel 
Issacharoff & Catherine Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 
1426 (2006) (asserting that “Gore and Campbell have effectuated a substantive 
rather than merely procedural revision of punitive damages law”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation 
in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2087 (1998); Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of 
Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105, 118–19, 127–28 (2005). 
 12. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. 2605. 
 13. See David T. Leitch, Is There a Constitution in (the) House?, 12 GREEN BAG 
2d 23, 33 (2008); Lester Sotsky & Daniel J. Stewart, Punitives Post-‘Exxon,’ NAT’L 
L.J., Sept. 29, 2008, at 12; Lewis Goldshore & Marsha Wolf, The Mother of All Oil 
Spills, 193 N.J. L.J., 510, No. 7, Index 473 (Aug. 18, 2008) (quoting Robin Conrad, 
executive vice president of National Chamber Litigation Center, as interpreting 
Exxon as “[l]imiting punitive damages to no more than the amount of [a] 
compensatory award”); 2 Robert L. Haig, BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION 
IN FEDERAL COURTS § 42:66.70 (2d ed. 2008); 4 Andrew L. Frey et al., BUSINESS AND 
COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS § 42:66.70 (2d ed. 2008). Just three 
months after Exxon was handed down, the American Tort Reform Association 
and the Chamber of Commerce filed an amicus brief in the U.S. Supreme Court, 
asking the Court explicitly to hold that the Constitution imposes a one-to-one 
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The Court’s opinion, however, reveals that its concerns with 
punitive awards are far less substantive than the result would suggest.  
“The real problem,” the Court said, “is the stark unpredictability of 
punitive awards.”14 The “spread between high and low individual 
awards,” the Court continued, “is unacceptable.”15 So in the absence of 
any statutory framework governing the size of maritime punitive 
awards, the Court felt entitled to establish a presumptive cap on awards 
that was just above the average amount awarded by juries in tort cases 
involving similar misconduct.16 
The Court’s emphasis on unpredictability—rather than its dramatic 
one-to-one remedy—finally reveals the Court’s true source of unease 
with the modern system of awarding punitive damages. In a nutshell, 
this Article contends, the Court perceives the common-law system of 
imposing civil punishment as mirroring two historically erratic systems 
of imposing criminal punishment. The Court expressly referred to one 
such system: the sentencing system for noncapital felonies that prevailed 
in federal courts before the advent of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines.17 Under that system, judges had unfettered discretion to 
choose sentences within enormous ranges.18 Judges, as a functional 
matter, could follow any theory of punishment they desired, and they 
could rely on any factors they wished in selecting sentences.19 
Consequently, a defendant who came up for sentencing had “no way of 
knowing or reliably predicting whether he [would] walk out of the 
courtroom on probation, or be locked up for a term of years that may 
consume the rest of his life, or something in between.”20 
The second system—unmentioned by the Court, but seemingly 
equally if not more salient—is the system of capital punishment that 
existed in the states prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. 
 
ratio in cases involving “very large compensatory damages and questionable 
reprehensibility.” Brief for American Tort Reform Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 14, NiSource, Inc. v. Estate of Garrison G. Tawney, 129 
S. Ct. 626 (2008) (No. 08-219), 2008 WL 4325538. At least one lower court already 
has accepted this argument.  See Jurinko v. Medical Protective Co., No. 06-3519, 
2008 WL 5378011 (3d Cir. Dec. 24, 2008). 
 14. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2625. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 2634. 
 17. Id. at 2626–28. 
 18. Id. at 2628 (noting that under the “indeterminate” federal system, judges 
had “relatively unguided discretion to sentence within a wide range,” and 
“similarly situated offenders were sentenced [to], and did actually serve, widely 
disparate sentences”). 
 19. Id. 
 20. MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 6 (1972). 
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Georgia.21 Under that system, every defendant convicted of murder or 
another capital offense was subject to the death penalty. Yet state law 
gave juries no rules or even guidance toward determining which 
offenders should be sentenced to death. As a result, capital punishment 
was arbitrarily imposed on an unlucky—rather than a necessarily more 
reprehensible—slice of the class of eligible offenders.22 
The Court’s treating the common law system of awarding punitive 
damages as equivalent to unstructured systems of imposing criminal 
punishment reveals that its recent invocation of due process principles 
to invalidate punitive awards is, at once, quite unremarkable and quite 
dramatic. It is unremarkable in the sense that it is boilerplate 
constitutional law that punishment may not be imposed arbitrarily. 
That, indeed, is the essence of the rule of law. It animates foundational 
due process principles such as the void-for-vagueness doctrine.23 
Furthermore, unpredictability is an infirmity that is easily addressed (at 
least in the sense of reducing unpredictability to a constitutionally 
acceptable level). For example, following Frankel’s critique of the federal 
sentencing system and the Court’s decision in Furman, legislatures 
stepped in to regularize criminal punishment in those realms. The result, 
a generation later, is a body of constitutional law in which the Supreme 
Court defers almost completely to legislative and administrative bodies 
concerning the permissible length of prison sentences and even as to 
when capital punishment may be imposed. There is no reason to believe 
that punitive damages law could not follow a similar path. 
At the same time, the Court’s suggestion that any system of 
punishment that produces erratic results violates the Due Process Clause 
is dramatic—even radical—in that it elevates the importance of 
legislation to a new and fairly extraordinary level. The Court historically 
has allowed states and the federal government to determine levels of 
punishment according to common law, relying within its elastic 
boundaries on individualized judgments of judges and juries. But now, 
even systems of punishment with deep common-law traditions of 
regulating discretion at a relatively high level are subject to 
constitutional challenge to the extent that they generate apparently 
unjustified disparities. The Court now reads the Due Process Clause, in 
short, to require policymaking bodies to regularize, through positive 
law, not just the presence but also the amount of punishment—and to 
give their democratic imprimatur to any regime allowing unusually 
harsh penalties. 
 
 21. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 22. Id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 23. See, e.g., Kolendar v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983). 
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The four parts of this article that follow explore the implications of 
this new brand of due process. More specifically, the Article lays out the 
implications of bringing punitive damages jurisprudence expressly into 
line with the regularization principle that exists in criminal sentencing 
law. The Article also describes the potential significance of doing the 
reverse—that is, applying the regularization principle as it already exists 
in punitive damages law to certain criminal sentencing systems to which 
the Supreme Court has not yet turned its attention. 
Part I quickly traces the arc of the Court’s recent punitive damages 
jurisprudence, from the Court’s refusal to protect defendants from 
“excessive” punishment under the Eighth Amendment, to its 
development of the current due process framework for reviewing 
punitive awards. Part II unpacks the analysis and holding of the Exxon 
case. Part III compares this analysis to the criminal sentencing reform 
movement and to the Furman revolution, describing how the same basic 
procedural concern animates each: a motivation to regularize 
punishment. 
Part IV is the meat of the article. It ponders the largely unexamined 
doctrinal consequences of the Court’s sharpened focus on regularizing 
punishment in punitive damages cases.24 It does so in relatively broad 
brush strokes, providing more a schematic for legal and doctrinal 
development than a prolonged consideration of any particular 
theoretical detail. 
Section A deals with the future of the Court’s punitive damages 
jurisprudence. It explains, first, how the Court’s insistence that 
punishment be regularized puts a premium on legislative involvement 
in authorizing and regulating punitive damages. Second, this section 
posits that once legislatures take responsibility for punitive damages, 
they have discretion to pursue a diverse array of goals through such 
damages. For example, a legislature could choose—as the plaintiffs 
 
 24. No recent articles of which I am aware argue, as I do here, that the 
Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence should be understood exclusively in 
terms of a check on arbitrariness. One piece published last year argues, as I do 
here, that criminal sentencing law should be expressly applied to punitive 
damages awards, granting increased deference to punitive awards when 
legislatures have expressly allowed the amount at issue. See Leo M. Romero, 
Punitive Damages, Criminal Punishment, and Proportionality: The Importance of 
Legislative Limits, 41 CONN L. REV. 109 (2008). But Professor Romero believes that 
legislatively authorized levels of punitive awards should merely “assist courts in 
the proportionality analysis” of such awards, id. at 119–20, whereas I contend 
that such limits should render substantive judicial analysis virtually nonexistent. 
Furthermore, Professor Romero approaches the question of proportionality 
solely from the perspective of retribution, see id. at 120–24, whereas I consider 
whether a state may pursue interests other than retribution in allowing punitive 
damages. See infra notes 159–163 and accompanying text. 
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unsuccessfully argued in the absence of legislation in Exxon—to allow 
enhanced punitive damages as quasi-compensation when necessary to 
force a defendant to internalize the full impact of its wrongdoing. Third, 
this section emphasizes that Congress and state legislatures have more 
leeway than one might think to statutorily authorize stiff punitive 
damage awards. In particular, they have discretion to allow punitive 
damages far exceeding a one-to-one ratio to compensatory damages, 
even in cases involving substantial damages. 
Section B turns the tables and quickly sketches the potential impact 
of the Court’s insistence on regularization on certain states’ criminal 
sentencing systems. While many such systems contain sufficient positive 
law to satisfy the Court’s concerns regarding predictability, some 
systems (perhaps a majority) still grant juries and judges expansive and 
virtually unregulated discretion to calibrate noncapital prison sentences. 
Outlier sentences imposed under these unstructured systems appear 
now to be susceptible to due process challenges. 
I.  LEGAL ORIGINS OF, AND MODERN RESTRICTIONS ON, PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES 
A. Background 
For centuries, juries have been allowed to impose punitive 
damages in tort cases.25 Though the precise purposes of such damages 
have varied somewhat over the years, modern courts generally agree 
that the predominant purposes of such damages are to punish and deter 
reprehensible behavior.26 
Under the common-law method of assessing punitive damages, a 
jury need not abide by any particular numerical limitations in setting the 
amount of such an award. As the Supreme Court has put it, the jury is 
simply “instructed to consider the gravity of the wrong and the need to 
deter similar wrongful conduct.”27 With this generalized guidance, the 
jury is largely free, “as the voice of the community,” to decide how 
much money the defendant should be forced to pay to the plaintiff.28 
The defendant has a right to appeal, but review is limited to whether the 
 
 25. See generally Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851) (recounting this 
history in the courts of upholding punitive damages judgments). 
 26. See, e.g., BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996). 
 27. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991). 
 28. BMW, 517 U.S. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Barry v. Edmunds, 
116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886) (“[N]othing is better settled than that . . . it is the peculiar 
function of the jury to determine the amount [of punitive damages]”); Day, 54 
U.S. at 371 (task of determining proper amount traditionally left to jury). 
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jury abused its discretion or acted with passion or prejudice—a test that 
might sound meaningful but that itself is discretionary and is generally 
perceived as being quite weak.29 
Twenty-one states—mainly in recent times—have established 
monetary caps on punitive damages or limits on the ratio a punitive 
award may bear to compensatory damages.30 Numerous federal 
statutory causes of action that allow for punitive damages limit them in 
a like manner.31 But the majority of states still impose no limit at all,32 as 
do the majority of federal statutes, such as the frequently invoked 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.33 
 
 29. See, e.g., Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 
433–35 (2001) (abuse of discretion); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 15 (appellate review for 
“reasonable[ness]”); Hardeman v. City of Albuquerque, 377 F.3d 1106, 1121–22 
(10th Cir. 2004) (“passion” or “prejudice”). 
 30. See Cooper, 532 U.S. at 433 n.6; BMW, 517 U.S. at 614–16 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (collecting such statutes). 
 31. See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 1142 (2006) (whistleblower protection for public 
transportation employees, limited to $250,000); 7 U.S.C. § 18 (2006) (violation of 
law governing commodity brokers; limited to two times actual damages); id. 
(violations of Commodities Exchange Act, limited to twice actual loss); 7 U.S.C. § 
21 (2006) (violation of law governing futures exchanges, limited to two times 
actual damages); id. (registered commodities futures association, limited to twice 
actual loss); 7 U.S.C. § 25 (2006) (violations of Commodities Futures Trading Act, 
limited to twice actual loss); id. (violation of law governing commodity 
exchanges, limited to two times actual damages); 15 U.S.C. § 1691e (2006) (equal 
credit opportunity, limited to $10,000 or 1% of net worth); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a 
(2006) (intentional employment discrimination, limited to $50,000 to $300,000, 
depending on size of employer); 49 U.S.C. § 20109 (2006) (whistleblower actions 
related to rail transportation, limited to $250,000); 49 U.S.C. § 31105 (2006) 
(retaliation for actions related to motor vehicle safety, limited to $250,000). 
 32. See Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages’ Iron Cage, 38 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1297, 1339–46 (2005). 
 33. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (holding that punitive damages are 
available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). For a selection of other federal statutes 
allowing punitive damages, see 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2006) (bad faith filing of 
bankruptcy petition); 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006) (willful breach of automatic stay in 
bankruptcy); 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006) (bid-rigging by purchasers from bankruptcy 
estate); 12 U.S.C. § 3417 (2006) (breach of financial privacy by government 
agency); 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2006) (wrongful disclosure of financial information by 
SEC); 15 U.S.C. § 298 (2006) (frivolous suit by jewelry trade association); 15 
U.S.C. § 1116 (2006) (wrongful seizure under the trademark act); 15 U.S.C. § 
1679g (2006) (violations by credit repair agencies); 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (2006) 
(unauthorized disclosure of consumer credit reports); 15 U.S.C. § 1691e 
(unauthorized disclosure by government agency of consumer credit reports); 17 
U.S.C. § 1322 (2006) (wrongful injunction for copyright violation); 18 U.S.C. § 248 
(2006) (interference with access to reproductive health clinics); 18 U.S.C. § 2252A 
(2006) (child pornography); 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2006) (wiretapping); 18 U.S.C. § 
2707 (2006) (unauthorized disclosure of electronic communications information); 
18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006) (wrongful disclosure of video tape rental or sale records); 
18 U.S.C. § 2724 (2006) (unauthorized release of information from state motor 
vehicle records); 20 U.S.C. § 1095a (2006) (discharge or discipline of employee 
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B. The Supreme Court’s Development of Restrictions on Punitive 
Awards 
Starting in the 1980s, the business bar undertook a concerted effort 
to curtail the effects of this system, particularly its ability to generate 
multimillion dollar awards. The bar’s first line of attack wielded the 
Eighth Amendment, which provides that “excessive fines” shall not be 
imposed, “nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”34 When the 
matter reached the Supreme Court, the defendant in a state antitrust 
action, Browning-Farris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., urged the Court 
to hold that the Eighth Amendment applied to punitive damages, 
thereby prohibiting any award the Court deemed excessive.35 The Court 
rejected the argument, holding that the Eighth Amendment applies only 
to state-imposed punishment, not to cases between private parties.36 
At the same time, the Court reserved the question whether the Due 
Process Clause might sometimes prohibit punitive damages above 
certain levels by “act[ing] as a check on undue jury discretion to award 
punitive damages in the absence of any express statutory limit.”37 In a 
concurrence, Justice Brennan (joined by Justice Marshall) explained why 
due process might well impose such a restriction: 
Without statutory (or at least common-law) standards for the 
determination of how large an award of punitive damages is 
appropriate in a given case, juries are left largely to themselves 
in making this important, and potentially devastating, decision. 
Indeed, the jury in this case was sent to the jury room with 
nothing more than the following terse instruction: “In 
determining the amount of punitive damages, . . . you may take 
 
whose salary is garnished); 25 U.S.C. § 305e (2006) (misrepresentation of Indian-
produced goods); 26 U.S.C. § 7431 (2006) (unauthorized inspection of tax return 
information); 31 U.S.C. § 3720D (2006) (discharge of employee whose wages are 
garnished to satisfy U.S. claim); 33 U.S.C. § 1514 (2006) (violation of regulations 
of deepwater ports, U.S. suit only); 39 U.S.C. § 3018 (2006) (mailing hazardous 
materials, US suit only); 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-23 (2006) (liability of vaccine 
manufacturers); 42 U.S.C. § 669a (2006) (improper disclosure of financial 
information); 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (2006) (discriminatory housing practice); 47 U.S.C. 
§ 338 (2006) (protection of privacy by satellite carrier); 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2006) 
(protection of cable subscriber privacy); 49 U.S.C. § 507 (2006) (transportation 
enforcement, actions by Attorney General only); 49 U.S.C. § 5122 (2006) (hazmat 
transportation, actions by Attorney General only); 49 U.S.C. § 60120 (2006) 
(pipeline safety, actions by Attorney General only). 
 34. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 35. See Browning-Farris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 275–76 
(1989). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 276–77. 
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into account the character of the defendants, their financial 
standing, and the nature of their acts.” Guidance like this is 
scarcely better than no guidance at all. I do not suggest that the 
instruction itself was in error; indeed, it appears to have been a 
correct statement of Vermont law. The point is, rather, that the 
instruction reveals a deeper flaw: the fact that punitive 
damages are imposed by juries guided by little more than an 
admonition to do what they think is best. Because “‘[t]he 
touchstone of due process is protection of the individual 
against arbitrary action of government,’” Daniels v. Williams, 
474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986), quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 
539 (1974), I for one would look longer and harder at an award 
of punitive damages based on such skeletal guidance than I 
would at one situated within a range of penalties as to which 
responsible officials had deliberated and then agreed.38 
The Court took up this subject in earnest, and ushered in its 
modern punitive damages jurisprudence, in BMW v. Gore.39 There, an 
Alabama jury, employing the common-law method of imposing 
punitive damages, imposed a punitive award of $2 million on the 
automobile manufacturer for failing to disclose that a car had been 
damaged and repainted prior to sale.40 The $2 million sum was about 
500 times the amount of the underlying harm.41 Declaring that 
“[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional 
jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice . . . of the severity 
of the penalty that a State may impose,” the Court held that the jury’s 
award was “grossly excessive.”42 
There is obvious tension in this language. The Court’s emphasis on 
“fair notice” is purely procedural. It suggests that if the Alabama 
Legislature had passed a law prior to the case establishing that any 
egregious instance of failure to disclose warranted punitive damages of 
$2 million or 500 times the underlying harm, then the award would have 
satisfied due process. On the other hand, the Court’s characterization of 
the award as “grossly excessive” in light of the absence of aggravating 
factors typically associated with particularly reprehensible conduct is a 
substantive criticism. It suggests that no amount of fair notice would 
have allowed the jury to impose such a large punitive award. 
The Court also drew comparisons between the jury’s award and 
 
 38. Id. at 281. 
 39. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 40. Id. at 599. 
 41. Id. at 583. 
 42. Id. at 574–75. 
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penalties that the Alabama Legislature had established for similar 
misconduct. But like other components of its analysis, this comparison 
was not clearly procedural or substantive. A punitive award’s imbalance 
compared to penalties for similar conduct might show that if the 
defendant lacked fair notice it could face an award this large. 
Alternatively, such an imbalance could support a finding that an award 
is too big in absolute terms. 
The Court’s decision seven years later, in State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,43 led most courts and commentators 
to conclude that the Supreme Court’s concerns with punitive damages 
are substantive in nature. In State Farm, the Court confronted a $145 
million punitive verdict that a Utah jury imposed in conjunction with a 
$1 million compensatory award for emotional distress a couple suffered 
while worrying that their insurance company would not cover a claim 
against them. The Court held that the punitive award was 
unsustainable.44 Speaking well beyond the facts of that case, the Court 
further suggested that at least when compensatory damages are 
“substantial,” then only a low ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages—perhaps only one-to-one—can satisfy the Due 
Process Clause.45 The Court described this rule as imposing a 
“substantive constitutional limitation[]” on punitive damages.46 
Still, to the extent that the State Farm Court offered justifications for 
advancing this purportedly substantive rule, it offered procedural 
critiques of Utah’s system of awarding punitive damages. The Court 
emphasized that defendants deserve “fair notice . . . of the severity of 
punishment that a state may impose”; that juries presented with 
marginally relevant and inflammatory evidence, as well as “vague 
instructions” are unable to behave rationally; and, more generally, that 
“defendants subjected to punitive damages in civil cases [are not] 
accorded the protections applicable in a criminal proceeding.”47 None of 
these problems, as a theoretical matter, is insurmountable. Each can be 
fixed in a way that still leaves tortfeasors and other defendants exposed 
to large punitive awards. 
 
 
 43. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 425. 
 46. Id. at 416. 
 47. Id. at 417–18. 
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II.  THE EXXON CASE 
On March 23, 1989, the supertanker Exxon Valdez departed Port 
Valdez, Alaska, loaded with 53 million gallons of crude oil.48 Captain 
Joseph Hazelwood, the master of the vessel and a relapsed alcoholic, 
had spent the day at waterfront bars drinking with crew members.49 He 
had consumed between five and nine double vodkas (between fifteen 
and twenty-seven ounces of 80-proof alcohol),50 and his blood alcohol 
level stood at about .241.51 He was “so drunk that a non-alcoholic would 
have passed out,”52 and he faced night voyage through the “icy and 
treacherous waters of Prince William Sound.”53 
While passing through the Sound’s commercial fishing waters, 
which sustained the regional economy and provided a subsistence 
lifestyle to thousands of Alaska Natives, Hazelwood steered the vessel 
away from some ice and toward Bligh Reef, a “known and foreseen 
hazard.”54 With the reef only minutes away, Hazelwood abandoned the 
bridge and went down to his cabin.55 He left control to the third mate—
who was “fatigued” on his second consecutive watch—with “vague” 
orders concerning the “tricky” turn necessary to avoid the approaching 
reef.56 With the third mate unable to perform both his own job and 
Hazelwood’s, the supertanker struck the reef. Eleven million gallons of 
the vessel’s toxic cargo gushed into the Sound, causing the “most 
notorious oil spill in recent times”57 and the “largest oil spill and greatest 
environmental disaster in American history.”58 
Thousands of plaintiffs filed suit against Exxon, seeking 
compensatory and punitive damages under maritime tort law. 
Eventually, at Exxon’s request, the district court established a 
mandatory punitive damages class of some 32,000 individuals and 
businesses, ensuring that any punitive award the jury imposed would 
be the one and only such award Exxon would have to pay.59 The district 
 
 48.  In re the Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1077 (D. Alaska 2004). 
 49. In re the Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 50. Id. 
 51. In re the Exxon Valdez, Order No. 265, 1995 WL 527989, at *5 (D. Alaska 
Jan. 27, 1995). 
 52. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1236. 
 53. Id. at 1238. 
 54. Id. at 1222. 
 55. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2612 (2008). 
 56. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1223, 1236. 
 57. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 96 (2000). 
 58. In re the Exxon Valdez, Order No. 265, 1995 WL 527989, at *4 (D. Alaska 
Jan. 27, 1995). 
 59. Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1225; In re the Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 
1071, 1078 (D. Alaska 2004). 
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court instructed the jury at trial—consistent with the principles the 
Supreme Court would later establish in BMW and State Farm—that it 
should calibrate any punitive award to the degree of Exxon’s 
reprehensibility and that it should bear a reasonable relationship to the 
plaintiffs’ compensatory damages, which totaled roughly $500 million.60 
The instructions, however, did not require the jury to make any finding 
beyond corporate recklessness in order to impose punitive damages.61 
Nor did they require the jury to find any particular degree of fault or 
anything else in order to impose punitive damages at any particular 
level.62 
The evidence at trial showed that Exxon, like the rest of the 
industry, had long known that any spill in Prince William Sound would 
be catastrophic because the region cradles an extremely valuable fishing 
industry and is home to thousands of Alaska Natives who engage in a 
subsistence lifestyle.63 At the same time, the Sound is quite remote, and 
Exxon knew that it and other relevant authorities lacked enough clean-
up equipment to react to a major spill.64 The plaintiffs further presented 
extensive evidence that, notwithstanding having all of this general 
knowledge, Exxon’s upper management had been aware for years 
before the spill that Hazelwood had been drinking aboard their ships 
and had declined to do anything to stop it.65 Exxon’s executives may 
have declined to intervene in part because an alcoholic culture pervaded 
Exxon Shipping Company, or perhaps they simply decided to ignore the 
risk that Hazelwood presented. In any case, the jury agreed with the 
plaintiffs that Exxon had acted recklessly66 and returned a punitive 
verdict for $5 billion.67 The Ninth Circuit later cut the award in half to 
 
 60. At the time of trial, the parties entered into a stipulation agreeing that the 
amount of compensable harm caused by the spill was between $432 million and 
$768 million. Eventually, the district court quantified the figure at $513 million. 
In re Exxon Valdez, 490 F.3d 1066, 1089 (9th Cir. 2007). Further refinements and 
settlements reduced the final figure to $507.5 million. This figure includes not 
just compensatory damages recovered at trial, but also payments Exxon made to 
compensate fisherman after the spill and various settlement payments made to 
other plaintiffs. 
 61. See In re the Exxon Valdez, Order No. 265, 1995 WL 527989, at *2 (D. 
Alaska Jan. 27, 2995). 
 62. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2614 n.2 (2008). The 
instructions did, however, give the jury guidance for assessing Exxon’s degree of 
fault. See infra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 63. Brief for Respondents at 4, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 
(2008) (No. 07–219), 2008 WL 194284. 
 64. Id. 
 65. In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F.Supp.2d 1071, 1077 (D. Alaska 2004). 
 66. In re the Exxon Valdez, Order No. 265, 1995 WL 527989, at *5 (D. Alaska 
Jan. 27, 2995). 
 67. In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F.Supp.2d at 1082. 
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$2.5 billion.68 
The Supreme Court granted review to assess, among other things, 
the legality of the award’s size.69 Because the case was grounded in 
maritime law, a species of federal common law, the Court claimed the 
ability to assess the $2.5 billion award not simply through the lens of 
defining “the outer limit allowed by due process,” but through the 
quasi-legislative lens of considering public policy—namely, “the 
desirability of regulating [punitive damages] as a common law 
remedy.”70 Still, the Court wove much of its constitutional jurisprudence 
into its analysis. Indeed, the best reading of the Court’s opinion is that it 
saw this case as an occasion to sharpen its critique of the common law 
system of awarding punitive damages, rather than to develop any new 
kind of approach to reviewing such awards.71 The opinion therefore 
gives especially valuable insight into the Court’s motivation for its 
current regulation of punitive damages. 
The Court began by explaining that the problem with the modern 
common law system for imposing punitive damages is not that awards 
are generally too large or too frequently awarded.72 Citing various 
empirical studies, the Court noted that the median ratio of punitive to 
compensatory damages (about 0.65 to 1) has remained relatively 
constant over the past several decades.73 The Court further found no 
marked increase over the past several decades in the percentage of cases 
with punitive awards.74 
“The real problem,” the Court concluded, “is the stark 
unpredictability of punitive awards.”75 The Court cited data indicating 
that the common law system produces occasional “outlier cases [that] 
subject defendants to punitive damages that dwarf corresponding 
compensatories.”76 The data troubled the Court because nothing 
suggested to it that the outlier cases correspond to particularly egregious 
behavior.77 Rather, the Court’s intuition was that cases with “strikingly 
similar facts” were sometimes producing vastly different results.78 
 
 68. See In re Exxon Valdez, 490 F.3d at 1073. 
 69. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2609 (2008). 
 70. Id. at 2626–27. 
 71. Perhaps the best evidence for this statement is the Court’s footnote at the 
end of the opinion that it “may well” have reached exactly the same conclusion 
as a matter of due process. Id. at 2634 n.28. 
 72. Id. at 2624–25. 
 73. Id. at 2625 n.14. 
 74. Id. at 2624. 
 75. Id. at 2625. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 2625–26. 
 78. Id. at 2626. 
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Unpredictability is fundamentally a procedural complaint. As the 
Court put it, 
Courts of law are concerned with fairness as consistency . . . . 
Thus, a penalty should be reasonably predictable in its severity, 
so that even Justice Holmes’s “bad man” can look ahead with 
some ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one 
course of action or another. And when the bad man’s 
counterparts turn up from time to time, the penalty scheme 
they face ought to threaten them with a fair probability of 
suffering in like degree when they wreak like damage.79 
Having armed itself with a charge to regularize punitive awards, 
all that was left was to enforce that mandate here. In the Court’s view, 
Exxon’s conduct did not involve any “earmarks of exceptional 
blameworthiness” because it was not intentional or malicious. Nor was 
it “driven primarily by a desire for gain.”80 Accordingly, the Court held 
that the award should not exceed the median level of punitive awards 
by any significant degree.81 It settled on a 1:1 ratio as a “fair upper limit” 
for maritime cases lacking elements of exceptional blameworthiness.”82 
This analysis resulted in the Court reducing the plaintiffs’ punitive 
award to just over $500 million.83 
III.  COMPARING PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO CRIMINAL SENTENCING 
Some commentators have complained that the Supreme Court’s 
punitive damages jurisprudence is “markedly inconsistent” with 
criminal sentencing law.84 The Court’s Exxon analysis, however, 
parallels the critique and solutions of two criminal sentencing reforms: 
(1) the movement toward determinate sentencing for noncapital 
offenses, culminating most famously in the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines; and (2) the judicial imposition of requirements for guiding 
juries’ determinations of which murderers are selected for capital 
punishment. Although the Court referenced the first in passing, it did 
 
 79. Id. at 2625–27. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 2634. 
 84. Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 1051 (arguing that the Court has been 
“markedly inconsistent both in terms of substantive limits and procedural 
requirements for these types of penalties”); see also Rachel A. Van Cleave, 
Mapping Proportionality Review: Still a “Road to Nowhere,” 43 TULSA L. REV. 709, 
723 (2008); James Headley, Proportionality Between Crimes, Offenses, and 
Punishments, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 247, 247–48 (2004). 
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not even mention the second. But it may well be that the second is the 
more revealing analogy. 
A. Sentencing Guidelines 
Prior to the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 
federal law did not impose any constraints on judges’ sentencing power, 
with the exception of establishing (very high) maximum punishments. 
Defendants convicted of felonies, therefore, frequently found themselves 
subjected to sentences anywhere from zero to twenty years, or even life, 
in prison. Judges could impose any length of punishment for virtually 
any reason, and appellate review was essentially unavailable. 
The most influential critique of this system came in 1972 from 
Marvin Frankel, at the time a federal district judge. He considered “the 
almost wholly unchecked and sweeping powers” judges had in the 
fashioning of sentences to be “terrifying and intolerable for a society that 
professes devotion to the rule of law.”85 Judge Frankel argued that 
allowing judges to select any length of sentence, without legislative 
guidance for “locating a particular case within any range,” was “prima 
facie at war with . . . equality, objectivity, and consistency in the law.”86 
In the absence of legislators at least “sketch[ing] democratically 
determined” purposes of sentencing and “rudimentary” guidelines for 
exercising sentencing discretion, Judge Frankel contended that the 
federal sentencing system violated the Due Process Clause.87 
The Supreme Court never had occasion to consider any direct due 
process challenge to the discretion-laden federal sentencing system. In 
1987, Congress obviated the need to do so, enacting the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines to address the problem Judge Frankel identified. 
But one would hardly have known that the Court did not expressly 
require Congress to revamp the federal sentencing system by reading 
the Exxon opinion; the Supreme Court proceeded effectively as though 
the Due Process Clause had required the creation of the Guidelines. 
The Court began by asserting that the current common-law method 
of assessing punitive damages closely resembles the pre-Guidelines state 
of affairs respecting criminal sentencing, except that juries assessing 
punitive damages typically lack even statutory maximums.88 That 
reality, in the Court’s view, rendered the common-law method of 
 
 85. FRANKEL, supra note 20, at 5. For a collection and summary of similar 
critiques and studies, see 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 
26.3(b) (3d ed. 2007–08). 
 86. FRANKEL, supra note 20, at 10. 
 87. Id. at 7–8. 
 88. See Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2627–28. 
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assessing punitive damages intolerable.89 In the absence of any positive 
law regulating maritime punitive damages,90 the Court did exactly what 
Congress in the Sentencing Reform Act directed the United States 
Sentencing Commission to do: it aggregated data regarding the actual 
punishment typically imposed for a class of conduct, and it insisted that 
all typical cases be punished in the middle of that range.91 
To be sure, the Court did not expressly hold that the Due Process 
Clause, as opposed to maritime law, forbids all “outlier” punitive 
awards imposed under the common law system.92 But the Court 
expressly built on its due process holdings in BMW and State Farm.93 It 
found it “instructive” that the federal government and many states, over 
the past twenty-five years, had replaced their practices of giving judges 
“relatively unguided discretion to sentence within a wide range” with 
systems that guide and confine judicial discretion within fairly narrow 
ranges.94 It also extolled the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for their role 
in “‘reduc[ing] unjustified disparities in criminal sentencing” and for 
“‘reach[ing] toward the evenhandedness and neutrality that are the 
distinguishing marks of any principled system of justice.’”95 It was as if 
Congress’s creation of the guidelines (around the time several other 
states took similar steps) formed a sort of mini “constitutional moment,” 
in which the nation rethought criminal sentencing and concluded that 
unjustified disparities were simply intolerable.96 
The implication seems inescapable: the Court’s punitive damages 
 
 89. See id. at 2627 (“[T]his feature of happenstance is in the tension with the 
function of the awards as punitive, just because of the implication of unfairness 
that an eccentrically high punitive verdict carries. . . .”). 
 90. The Court’s strained survey of other statutes allowing punitive damages 
and other kinds of punitive fines illuminated the oft-disrespected “comparable 
penalties” guidepost it established in BMW. Compare BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 
583–84 (1996) with In re Exxon Valdez 490 F.3d 1066, 1094–95 (2007) (questioning 
purpose and importance of guidepost). The Court through that guidepost had 
been looking not just for a point of comparison for the amount of punishment at 
issue; it had been groping for some positive legislative enactment to inform its 
analysis. 
 91. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2629. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg 
dissented because they thought it was unwise for the Court to take this 
legislative-style approach. They would have restricted their review, in the 
absence of any positive law on the subject, to whether the award amounted to an 
abuse of discretion. See Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2635–36 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 92. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2610. 
 93. See id. at 2622, 2625–26. 
 94. Id. at 2628. 
 95. Id. at 2627 (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996)). 
 96. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) (setting 
forth theory of “constitutional moments”). 
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jurisprudence in general (not just within the realm of maritime law) is 
aimed at superimposing some minimum level of law on what the Court 
perceives to be an unjustifiably lawless system. Even assuming that the 
Court would not feel free to impose quite as strict limits on unstructured 
state systems as the federal maritime system,97 the same reasoning 
infuses both lines of cases. The Due Process Clause—indeed, the rule of 
law itself—requires civil as well as criminal punishment to be 
regularized.98 
This conclusion might seem odd in light of the fact that Justice 
Breyer, an architect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Court’s 
chief defender of the Guidelines, dissented from the result in Exxon. But 
Justice Breyer’s dissent actually confirms the Court’s orientation. Justice 
Breyer accepted the majority’s premise that, as he put it, “there is a need, 
grounded in the rule of law itself, to assure that punitive damages are 
awarded according to meaningful standards that will provide notice of 
how harshly certain acts will be punished and that will help to assure 
the uniform treatment of similarly situated persons.”99 He simply 
disagreed on how to apply that premise. In contrast to the majority, 
Justice Breyer thought that Exxon’s conduct was not a “mine-run case of 
reckless behavior.”100 Thus, in the parlance of the Guidelines, he thought 
that the lower courts were warranted in allowing an “upward 
departure” in the case.101 
 
 97. This seems to be a safe assumption. The Court described its maritime 
analysis in Exxon as “more rigorous” than its constitutional jurisprudence. 128 S. 
Ct. at 2629. 
 98. The Court struck a similar theme (though less explicitly) in the last 
punitive damages decision it issued prior to Exxon. In Philip Morris USA v. 
Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007), the Court explicitly restricted its focus to 
“procedural limitations” on punitive awards and issued limitations on juries’ 
ability to consider defendants’ actions against nonparties in assessing punitive 
damages. The Court described this limitation as necessary “to avoid an arbitrary 
determination of an award’s amount.” Id. at 1062. Furthermore, some lower 
courts prior to Exxon already had conceptualized the due process line of cases as 
focusing on regularization. See Thomas v. iStar Financial, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d 
252, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding award excessive because “the jury’s award is 
not in line with the punitive damages awarded in similar cases by this Court or 
other courts in this Circuit”); Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150 v. Lowe 
Excavating Co., 870 N.E.2d 303, 322–23 (Ill. 2006) (“In our estimation, the best 
way to determine whether a given ratio is appropriate is to compare it to 
punitive damages awards in other, similar cases.”). 
 99. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2640 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (citing BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 587 (1996) (Breyer, J., 
concurring)). 
 100. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 101. Justice Breyer’s increased willingness to defer to the district court’s 
assessment of the defendant’s conduct as unusually reprehensible was in 
keeping with his view in the criminal sentencing realm that appellate judges 
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B. Modern Capital Punishment Law 
The Supreme Court’s Exxon analysis also bears a strong 
resemblance to its treatment of capital punishment laws a generation 
ago. In 1972—the same year in which Judge Frankel issued his stinging 
critique of the federal sentencing system—the Court in Furman v. 
Georgia102 confronted the prevailing system in the states for imposing 
capital punishment.103 Under this system, statutes permitted the death 
penalty for murder and sometimes other serious crimes such as rape or 
kidnapping.104 Yet state law did not require death to be imposed in any 
case.105 Instead, the law left it to judges or juries to decide which 
offenders, if any, should be sentenced to death.106 And as it turned out, 
those decision-makers sentenced only a small fraction of offenders to 
death. 
Faced with the infrequency of death sentences and, as Justice White 
famously put it, “no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in 
which [capital punishment] is imposed from the many cases in which it 
is not,”107 the Court held this sentencing system violated the Eighth 
Amendment. The Court emphatically did not hold that capital 
punishment itself was always constitutionally excessive punishment;108 
just four years later, in fact, it explicitly upheld the practice as applied to 
murder.109 But the Furman Court held that the Eighth Amendment does 
not tolerate such harsh punishment to be “wantonly and freakishly 
imposed.”110 “[W]here discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a 
matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be 
taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so 
 
should defer to district judges’ front-line assessments of defendants’ conduct.  
See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises 
Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 6–7; United States v. Mendez-Colon, 
15 F.3d 188, 190–91 (1st Cir. 1994) (Breyer, C.J.) ; United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 
874 F.2d 43, 49–52 (1st Cir. 1994) (Breyer, J., joining opinion of Selya, J.). 
 102. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 103. See id. 
 104. Id. at 341 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 311 (White, J., concurring). 
 107. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring); see also id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., 
concurring). 
 108. Id. at 310–11 (White, J., concurring). 
 109. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 110. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). There was no majority 
opinion in Furman, so the Court’s “holding” consisted of the narrowest grounds 
that garnered a majority: the opinions of Justices Stewart and White. See id. at 
375. 
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as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”111 
Indeed, if state law does not channel such discretion, the Constitution 
forbids capital punishment even for the most atrocious murders.112 
States have responded to Furman and its progeny by codifying 
various “aggravating factors” designed to distinguish typical murders 
from those deserving of the possibility of capital punishment.113 And by 
operation of the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial clause, juries must find 
such facts beyond a reasonable doubt.114 
Although the Exxon Court never referred to the Furman line of 
cases, Exxon’s analysis bears obvious parallels to Furman’s desire to 
regularize punishment. In fact, in at least one respect, Furman should 
have been a more obvious parallel than the sentencing guidelines: the 
Furman Court, like the Exxon Court, was expressly concerned with 
placing boundless discretion in the hands of juries, whereas the 
sentencing guidelines movement targeted excessive judicial discretion. 
Placing undue discretion in the hands of juries raises concerns regarding 
arbitrariness in a few particularly acute ways. 
First, juries are one-off enterprises. It is in many ways 
advantageous to use a collection of citizens unjaded by the daily grind 
of courtroom litigation to pass judgment in individual cases. But juries 
generally are unable (at least without any legal guidance) to compare a 
case they are seeing to other cases like it and to decide whether a set of 
facts is particularly egregious.115 This disability may be even more 
 
 111. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 
189) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). The Court has restricted 
capital punishment with respect to crimes against individuals to cases in which a 
homicide occurs. See infra at note 191 and accompanying text. 
 112. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363 (1988) (“reject[ing] the 
submission that a particular set of facts surrounding a murder, however 
shocking they might be, [a]re enough in themselves, and without some 
narrowing principle to apply to [the] facts, to warrant imposition of the death 
penalty”). 
 113. See, e.g., Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971–72 (1994). As the Court 
has explained, aggravating circumstances “may be contained in the definition of 
the crime or in a separate sentencing factor (or both).” Id. at 972. One other 
possible response to a concern over inconsistency in punishment, of course, is to 
make the punishment at issue mandatory. But the Court has held that because of 
the unique nature of the death penalty, a legislature cannot make its imposition 
mandatory for murder or any other basic crime.  See Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). Save possibly “the rarest kind of capital case,” the 
jury must be given the opportunity to exercise mercy and to spare the defendant 
capital punishment.  See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604–05 (1978). 
 114. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 115. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 24, at 155; Roselle L. Wissler et al., Instructing 
Jurors on General Damages in Personal Injury Cases: Problems and Possibilities, 6 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 712, 718 (2000). 
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pronounced in the realm of corporate misconduct, in which identifiable 
markers of especially reprehensible conduct may be more elusive than 
in the context of homicides.116 
Second, even insofar as juries can be educated through evidence 
regarding typical kinds of torts or murders, juries are simply not trained, 
as judges are, to seek and to value legal consistency.117 While judges are 
likely to give substantial consideration in sentencing to treating like 
offenders similarly (at least like offenders that they personally sentence), 
juries may be more willing to deviate from the norm if they perceive the 
norm to be off kilter. Indeed, that is part of the reason we have juries, at 
least with respect to mitigation in the criminal context. For centuries, we 
have depended on juries to invoke their nullification power when the 
letter of the law dictates what they believe to be unjust punishment.118 
Given the power, as Judge Friendly once put it, to issue verdicts “in the 
teeth of both law and facts . . . to prevent punishment from getting out 
of line with the crime,”119 there is reason at least to worry that juries will 
on occasion do the same thing for the opposite reason—that is, issue 
verdicts that disregard the law to deliver extra punishment that they 
believe is appropriate.120 
 
 116. See infra notes 200–94 and accompanying text. 
 117. See, e.g., Sunstein et al., supra note 11. 
 118. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304 (2004) (describing jury’s role 
as “circuitbreaker in the State’s machinery of justice”); Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976) (discussing jury’s historic role of returning 
noncapital verdicts notwithstanding the evidence in order to avoid mandatory 
death sentences that followed from convictions for certain crimes). 
 119. United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 902 (2d Cir. 1960). 
 120. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An 
Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2002) (studying actual cases in which 
judges or juries awarded punitive damages and finding that while each award 
punitive damages at similar rates and in overall similar amounts, jury awards 
produce a greater spread and rare outliers). Following the Exxon verdict, Exxon 
funded a number of studies designed to show—and that purportedly do show—
that different juries given the same case are prone to render wildly different 
punitive judgments. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: 
HOW JURIES DECIDE (University of Chicago Press 2002); David Schkade et al., 
Empirical Study: Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
1139 (2000); Hastie, et al., Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiff’s 
Requests and Plaintiff’s Identity on Punitive Damages Awards, 23 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 445 (1999); Sunstein et al., supra note 11.  For background on how this 
body of work came into being, see William R. Freudenberg, Seeding Science, 
Courting Conclusions: Reexamining the Intersection of Science, Corporate Cash, and the 
Law, 20 SOC. F. 3, 13–19 (2005). Some scholars dispute the value of this research, 
which is based on mock juries given hypothetical fact patterns. See, e.g., Neil 
Vidmar, Experimental Simulations and Tort Reform, Avoidance, Error, and 
Overreaching in Sunstein et al.’s Punitive Damages, 53 EMORY L.J. 1359 (2004); Neal 
Feigenson, Can Tort Juries Punish Competently? 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 239 (2002) 
(Book Review);  Steven Graber, Punitive Damages and Deterrence of Efficiency-
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Third, juries may be more susceptible than judges to bias. Juries 
deliberate in private and are by definition immune from any kind of 
systematic study of their decision making across cases. Thus, even 
before Exxon, the Court openly worried about the possibility that 
leaving juries with wide discretion “creates the potential that juries will 
use their verdicts to express biases against big businesses, particularly 
those without strong local presences.”121 This worry echoes the Justices’ 
repeated concern in the Furman line of cases that affording unguided 
discretion to juries poses “an unacceptable risk that a sentence will 
succumb to either overt or subtle racial impulses or appeals.”122 While 
legal restrictions on discretion cannot stamp out the potential for 
discriminatory punishments, such restrictions obviously can keep such 
impulses in check and limit their effects. 
Lest there be any doubt regarding the strength of the parallel here, 
the dissents in punitive damages cases―like Justice Breyer’s dissent in 
Exxon respecting the parallel to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines123―prove the point. The most vocal dissenter from the 
punitive damages cases invoking the Due Process Clause to invalidate 
large awards has been Justice Scalia, the same justice who, more than 
anyone else on the Court, has championed the role of juries in delivering 
individualized justice.124 It is also he, more than anyone else on the 
Court, who continually has criticized the Furman line of jurisprudence as 
 
Promoting Analysis: A Problem Without a Solution?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1809 (2000); 
Robert J. MacCoun, Epistemological Dilemmas in the Assessment of Legal Decision 
Making, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 723 (1999). My point here is not to choose sides 
in this empirical debate, but rather to explain theoretically why the Court might 
be particularly concerned—whether justified or not—with granting juries 
unbounded discretion to assign punitive damages. 
 121. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003) 
(quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting)). Some research indicates that juries are not actually biased against 
business. See VALERIE HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL, ch. 5–7 (Yale University Press 
2000). As with claims that juries are more likely than judges to produce outlier 
awards, I do not here draw any empirical conclusion in this respect. 
 122. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 992 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 
see also Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 496–97 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“For 20 years, we have acknowledged the relationship between unguided jury 
discretion and the danger of discriminatory sentencing―a danger we have held 
to be inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment.”); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238, 249–51 (Douglas, J., concurring); Id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 123. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2608 (2008). 
 124. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Ring v. Arizona, 536 
U.S. 584, 610–13 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466, 498–500 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30–
40 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
FISHER_FMT6.DOC 5/1/2009  4:29:14 PM 
24 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 26:1 
 
illegitimate and unnecessary.125 Unlike Justice Breyer, Justice Scalia sees 
little need for legislative regularization (or, as he has put it, a 
“bureaucratic realm of perfect equity”).126 Rather, Justice Scalia believes 
it is better to let “the people” do as they see fit based on the facts of 
particular cases. But while Justice Scalia has largely been successful in 
persuading a majority of the Court to involve juries in decision making 
that leads to punishment,127 he has not persuaded a majority to leave the 
question to juries’ discretion. 
IV.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALLY REGULARIZING 
PUNISHMENT 
The convergence between punitive damages jurisprudence and 
criminal sentencing principles has significant implications. Most 
importantly, the Supreme Court’s robust body of criminal sentencing 
jurisprudence allows us to peek into the future and to predict ways in 
which the Court’s more nascent venture into regulating punitive 
damages is likely to―or at least should―settle out. The Supreme Court 
regulates criminal sentencing almost exclusively on procedural grounds; 
among other things, defendants must have fair notice of potential 
penalties,128 juries must be instructed in certain ways,129 and juries 
instead of courts must be asked to make certain kinds of factual 
determinations.130 But as long as a legislative body has sorted types of 
 
 125. See, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 610–13; Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 659–70 
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 126. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498–99 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 127. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007); United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498–500. 
 128. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478 (defendant must be able to “predict 
with certainty from the face of a felony indictment” the maximum permissible 
punishment); United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39 (1994) (defendant’s 
sentence may not be increased pursuant to ambiguous statute because 
defendants must have clear and unambiguous notice of potential punishments); 
Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381 (1980); Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398 
(1980); Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978); see also Bouie v. City of 
Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354 (1964) (due process prohibits state court from 
construing a criminal statute in an “unexpected and indefensible” way “by 
reference to the law which has been expressed prior to the conduct at issue”). 
 129. See, e.g., Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (holding juries in 
capital cases in which prosecutors seek a death sentence on the basis of future 
dangerousness must be instructed regarding the potential for parole if defendant 
is sentenced to life imprisonment). 
 130. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 (holding juries must find any fact other 
than a prior conviction that subjects a defendant to heightened punishment); 
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (holding the same in the context of 
non-advisory sentencing guidelines regimes). 
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misconduct into some kind of hierarchy and established maximum 
punishments, a sentencing judge or jury that follows proper procedures 
in imposing a particular sentence enjoys nearly absolute deference from 
the Court for its case-specific decisions. If anything, this deference 
should be even more pronounced when legislative determinations 
respecting punitive damages supply frameworks for jury verdicts. 
Conversely, the Court’s application of a rigorous predictability 
requirement to punitive damages has at least one important implication 
for criminal sentencing law: it indicates that a number of state 
sentencing systems resembling the pre-Guidelines federal system are 
now vulnerable to constitutional attack. 
A. Punitive Damages 
Now that the Court has indicated that its punitive damages 
jurisprudence is motivated by a concern for protecting defendants from 
unpredictable punitive damages in the same way defendants should be 
protected from unpredictable criminal punishment, any theoretical 
constructs that insulate criminal sentences from substantive 
constitutional infirmity should likewise insulate punitive damages from 
such infirmity. I will focus here on three such constructs and apply them 
to punitive damages. First, despite the Eighth Amendment’s explicit 
invitation for courts to disallow “cruel and unusual punishments,” the 
Court treats setting criminal punishments as an almost purely legislative 
task and defers almost completely to legislative and other deliberative 
policymaking actors that establish punishment regimes in democratic 
ways. The Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence, contrary to its 
surface impressions, invites the same kind of dynamic. Second, once a 
deliberative body has enacted positive criminal sentencing law, the 
Court allows state and local governments to pursue a wide array of 
interests or policy goals through widely divergent sentencing systems. 
The same should be true with respect to punitive damages. Third, as 
long as a deliberative body has enacted positive law establishing 
quantified levels of criminal punishment, the Court allows states to 
impose punishment at almost any level it wishes. The same should be 
true with respect to punitive damages, even in cases involving 
substantial compensatory damages, in which the Court has suggested 
the Due Process Clause most closely regulates the size of punitive 
awards.131 
 
 131. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2634 n.28 (2008); State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). 
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1. Encouraging Democratic Development of Law 
The Court’s criminal sentencing jurisprudence starts from the 
premise that legislatures have the “primary responsibility for making 
the difficult policy choices that underlie any criminal sentencing 
scheme.”132 Accordingly, a foremost goal of this jurisprudence seems to 
be to push legislatures to make such policy choices, instead of leaving 
them to the court system. This observation is true not just in terms of 
setting maximum punishments but also in terms of establishing 
guidelines for sorting individual cases within the resulting sentencing 
ranges.133 Once a legislature sets a statutory level of punishment through 
the democratic process, the Court defers to it as long as the legislature 
had a “reasonable basis” for believing that it would “advance the goals 
of [the state’s] criminal justice system in any substantial way.”134 The 
Court takes the same approach with respect to civil and criminal fines, 
which resemble punitive damages even more than traditional criminal 
punishments.135 
This preference and respect for statutory law in the realm of 
sentencing and fines—a preference captured to a significant degree in 
Justice Breyer’s concept of “active liberty”136—is part of a larger theme in 
the Court’s jurisprudence: the Court sometimes issues constitutional 
rulings that appear to be substantive prohibitions but that actually are 
simply entreaties for legislative engagement. The Court, for example, 
has issued decisions in the context of national security that do not so 
much foreclose governmental action as they force Congress to step into 
 
 132. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003). 
 133. Justice White’s closing words in Furman speak particularly directly to 
this issue: “In this respect, I add only that past and present legislative judgment 
with respect to the death penalty loses much of its force when viewed in light of 
the recurring practice of delegating sentencing authority to the jury and the fact 
that a jury, in its own discretion and without violating its trust or any statutory 
policy, may refuse to impose the death penalty no matter what the 
circumstances of the crime. Legislative ‘policy’ is thus necessarily defined not by 
what is legislatively authorized but by what juries and judges do in exercising 
the discretion so regularly conferred upon them. In my judgment what was done 
in these cases violated the Eighth Amendment.” 408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972) (White, 
J., concurring). 
 134. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 297 n.22 
(1983)). The Court has similarly stated in the context of capital punishment that 
“the sanction imposed cannot be so totally without penological justification that 
it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
183 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). 
 135. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334–37 (1998) (emphasizing 
that judgments about appropriate size of fines “belong in the first instance to the 
legislature” and that fines violate the Constitution only if “grossly 
disproportional” to the conduct at issue). 
 136. See generally STEPHEN G. BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY (Vintage 2005). 
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policymaking debates concerning these delicate matters.137 The Court 
even has gone so far on occasion as to invoke the Constitution to 
invalidate laws in this realm, while expressly reserving the question of 
whether the very same laws would be constitutional if reenacted in a 
more carefully considered manner. In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, for 
instance, the Court invalidated federal regulations depriving aliens of 
the ability to work in federal service positions.138 The Court nevertheless 
explained that such discriminatory action might be valid if Congress 
explicitly determined after “a considered evaluation” that it was 
necessary.139 The Court has taken similar actions in other areas, 
disallowing a death sentence for a fifteen year old140 and invalidating a 
felon disenfranchisement law.141 Guido Calabresi describes such rulings 
as constitutionally requiring legislatures “to take a ‘second look’ with 
the eyes of the people on it.”142 
The problem with the current state of affairs with respect to 
punitive damages is that there is little to no democratically enacted 
law.143 Most states lack even a single statute on the books allowing 
punitive damages in tort cases, much less capping punitive exposure by 
means of a maximum ratio or dollar amount.144 And almost all states 
 
 137. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (defending decision holding that the President could not unilaterally 
establish rules governing detainees in Guantanamo Bay because “[t]he 
Constitution places its faith in [the] democratic means” of “consultation with 
Congress”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that due process 
requires giving people detained as “enemy combatants” an opportunity to prove 
that they are being wrongfully detained); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 
88, 115–16 (1976) (invalidating federal regulations depriving aliens of the ability 
to work in federal service positions because nothing indicated the President or 
Congress had given the matter “a considered evaluation”). 
 138. 426 U.S. 88 (1976). 
 139. Id. at 115. 
 140. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 857 (1988) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (providing the fifth vote to hold that punishment violated the 
Eighth Amendment simply because it was unclear whether the legislature 
intended to make such punishment available). 
 141. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (holding that a felon 
disenfranchisement law enacted for racially discriminatory reasons was invalid, 
even though the Constitution allows such disenfranchisement as a general 
matter). 
 142. Guido Calabresi, Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional 
Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80, 104 
(1991). 
 143. In this respect, I agree with Leo Romero’s observation that “[t]he critical 
difference between the Court’s approaches in reviewing punitive damages and 
criminal sentences for excessiveness is the presence of legislative limits on 
criminal punishment and the absence of legislative limits on punitive damages 
awards.”  Romero, supra note 24, at 140. 
 144. Rustad, supra note 32, at 1370–1417 (fifty-state survey). 
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lack legislation establishing any kind of hierarchy of fault within the 
realm of conduct subject to punitive damages.145 Finally, in contrast even 
to excessively discretionary sentencing regimes the Court has criticized, 
decisions to seek punitive damages are typically made by private parties 
instead of politically accountable public officials.146 
The Supreme Court seems to think a “second look” is in order. In 
the meantime, this absence of positive law—and of demonstrable 
democratic support for extremely large punitive awards—exposes the 
common-law system not only to charges of unpredictability,147 but also 
to the attack that it “is at odds with the central democratic principle that 
policy questions are decided by the people’s elected representatives,” 
not by randomly selected juries.148 Extremely large punitive awards 
embody and often effectuate judgments concerning the social utility of 
conduct.149 Consequently, as Judge Alex Kozinski has argued, such 
judgments should be made by legislatures. Juries should do no more 
than sort out factual controversies and apply preexisting legislative 
judgments to particular cases.150 
Of course, one could respond that in a democracy in which 
corporate interests often have an inordinate effect on—if not an outright 
stranglehold on—the legislative process, it is appropriate (or even 
necessary) for juries to be able to regulate corporations free and clear of 
legislation. Legislators with fundraising and other financial concerns, 
the argument goes, are simply too beholden to corporate interests to be 
trusted to expose them to the level of punishment they deserve and that 
is socially desirable. 
There are obvious responses to this counterargument, not the least 
of which is that consumers and other potential plaintiffs actually are 
fairly well-represented in the legislative process.151 But the important 
 
 145. See id. at 1348–49. 
 146. See Pamela S. Karlan, “Pricking the Lines”: The Due Process Clause, Punitive 
Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880, 919 (2004). 
 147. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 148. Alex Kozinski, The Case of Punitive Damages v. Democracy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
19, 1995, A18; see also Romero, supra note 24 at 116 (“Punitive damages . . . 
punish without a societal judgment about proportionality in the many states that 
have no legislatively imposed limits.”). 
 149. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 355 (2007) (noting 
“the risk that punitive damages awards can, in practice, impose one State’s (or 
one jury’s) policies (e.g., banning cigarettes) upon other States”). 
 150. See Kozinski, supra note 148. 
 151. See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan, How Much Do Conservative Tort Tales Matter?, 
31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 711, 714 (2006) (noting that “the American Trial Lawyers 
Association (ATLA) and its state-level affiliates have devoted huge campaign 
contributions and considerable lobbying skill to fight tort reform bills in state 
FISHER_FMT6.DOC 5/1/2009  4:29:14 PM 
2009 THE EXXON VALDEZ CASE 29 
 
point for present purposes is that the Supreme Court clearly has come 
down on the side of preferring legislation. This is so even though the 
Court has held in other contexts that there is no difference between state 
legislation and what we have here (at least when state courts uphold 
punitive verdicts): state-court explications of state law and policy.152 The 
Court, in other words, has implicitly rejected the argument that “[g]iven 
the widespread adoption of legislative schemes to limit the amount of 
punitive damages awards, any state without such a scheme has, in 
effect, an implicit legislative endorsement of that state’s common-law 
scheme for determining the amount of punitive damages.”153 
Similarly, the Court has clearly rejected the claim of some 
commentators that the “solution” to any concerns about unpredictability 
in punitive awards is simply to “provide detailed written instructions” 
to juries.154 Such instructions, some commentators argued before Exxon, 
adequately guide a jury’s consideration of a defendant’s conduct and the 
proper relationship between the underlying harm and any punitive 
award.155 But the jury in Exxon received such instructions. Not only was 
the jury (somewhat presciently) instructed on the “very same concepts” 
later crystallized in the Supreme Court’s due process cases, but it also 
was given “unusually detailed” guidance for calibrating any punitive 
award to the level of Exxon’s wrongdoing.156 
The jury in Exxon was told, for instance, that it could consider: (1) 
whether corporate policy contributed to, or actually prescribed, the 
wrongdoing; (2) whether corporate policy makers and people with 
significant duties and responsibilities, or just low-level employees, 
participated in the wrongdoing; (3) whether several employees or just a 
limited number played roles in the misconduct; (4) whether Exxon had 
taken steps to prevent recurrence of the wrongdoing; (5) whether 
 
legislatures and Congress,” and that “ATLA often has been effective in blocking 
or watering down conservative tort reform bills”). 
 152. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 364 (2003) (holding that the state 
supreme court’s approval of jury instructions “is a ruling on a question of state 
law that is binding on us as though the precise words had been written” into a 
state statute) (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)). 
 153. F. Patrick Hubbard, Substantive Due Process Limits on Punitive Damages 
Awards: “Morals Without Technique?”, 60 FLA. L. REV. 349, 385 (2008) (internal 
citation omitted). 
 154. Neil Vidmar & Matthew W. Wolfe, Fairness Through Guidance: Jury 
Instructions on Punitive Damages After Philip Morris v. Williams, 2 CHARLESTON L. 
REV. 307, 318–24 (2008). But see Romero, supra note 24, at 156 (arguing that jury 
instructions are inadequate without legislative cap). 
 155. Vidmar, supra note 154, at 318–24. 
 156. In re the Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1080 (D. Alaska 2004). See 
Jury instructions 30, 35, 36, and 38, reprinted in App. to Brief for Respondents 
17a–21a, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008). 
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criminal and civil fines Exxon had already paid, coupled with its clean-
up costs, mitigated the need for any award that otherwise would be 
proper; (6) whether the social condemnation Exxon had suffered 
mitigated the need for any punitive award; and (7) whether a punitive 
award might be borne by Exxon shareholders.157 It is not easy to think of 
additional guidance the district court could have given the jury to aid it 
in assessing the relative need to punish and deter Exxon’s 
wrongdoing.158 
But the “law” in the Exxon jury instructions came from the court 
and the parties, not from Congress. Unlike a capital prosecution or a 
structured criminal sentencing regime, there was no congressionally 
established structure within which the jury and trial judge were 
required to exercise their discretion. There was no quantified starting 
point to use considering all of the potentially aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, and there was no stratified range of potential misdeeds 
in which they might have placed Exxon’s conduct. Hence, the Court 
treated the jury’s verdict and the district judge’s approval of it as 
determinations that did not incorporate or reflect any democratically 
established policy determinations. In order to trigger the Court’s 
practice in its criminal sentencing jurisprudence of deferring to policy 
determinations concerning how best to punish misconduct, a 
legislature—not a court or parties—must set the policy guidelines at 
issue. 
2. Pursuing Varied State Interests 
Although it is now plain that the Court intends to view skeptically 
any punitive award rendered under a pure common law system, the flip 
side of the Court’s preference for legislatively regularizing punishment 
should mean that it will relax its skepticism when Congress or a state 
legislature has enacted positive law allowing and governing the 
punitive award at issue. Indeed, it appears that the Court should afford 
extreme deference to such legislative judgments. This deference should 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. One commentator has suggested that juries could be instructed 
regarding typical awards in similar cases as a way of giving them benchmarks 
for awarding punitive damages. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive 
Damages: Empirical Insights and Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 197–
99 (2002). But see Cass R. Sunstein et al., supra note 120 (arguing that such 
instructions would help reduce, but would not cure, the problem of 
arbitrariness). Regardless of whether that is feasible in a typical tort case 
involving reprehensible conduct, it was not an option in Exxon, for the oil spill 
had no real parallel. At any rate, it is difficult to imagine evidence or an 
instruction like this satisfying the Court in the absence of any legislative 
imprimatur of the judgments in “similar” cases. 
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begin with an explicit recognition that legislatures may seek to further a 
broad array of governmental interests through permitting punitive 
damages. 
In the realm of criminal sentencing, the Court has emphasized that: 
The Constitution does not mandate adoption of any one 
penological theory. A sentence can have a variety of 
justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or 
rehabilitation. . . . Selecting the sentencing rationales is 
generally a policy choice to be made by state legislatures, not 
federal courts.159 
Accordingly, although deterrence and retribution are the most 
common governmental interests furthered by criminal sentencing, the 
Court readily deferred in Ewing v. California to the California 
Legislature’s judgment that protecting the public safety requires 
“incapacitating” those with two prior serious violent felony convictions 
who commit even low-level felonies.160 The Court similarly deferred in 
Harmelin v. Michigan to the Michigan Legislature’s determination that 
sentences should be tailored particularly to threats it believed that the 
possession of large amounts of drugs pose to society.161 
The Supreme Court also appears to readily accept legislative policy 
goals supporting other systems of awarding non-compensatory 
damages. In Exxon, for instance, the Court noted without an ounce of 
skepticism that “Congress devised the treble damages remedy for 
private antitrust actions with an eye to supplementing official 
enforcement by inducing private litigation, which might otherwise have 
been too rare if nothing but compensatory damages were available at 
the end of the day.”162 States frequently defend treble damages in 
 
 159. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (internal citations omitted); see 
also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in judgment) (“the responsibility for making these 
fundamental choices and implementing them lies with the legislature”); Gore v. 
United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (“Whatever views may be entertained 
regarding severity of punishment, whether one believes in its efficacy or its 
futility, [. . .] these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy”). 
 160. 538 U.S. at 25; see also id. at 29 (holding that a court must “accord proper 
deference to the policy judgments that find expression in the legislature’s choice 
of sanctions”). 
 161. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1003 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
 162. 128 S. Ct. at 2632; see generally Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng. v. Hydrolevel 
Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 575 (1982) (reciting various justifications for antitrust treble 
damages); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979) (focusing on private 
litigation-enhancing role). 
FISHER_FMT6.DOC 5/1/2009  4:29:14 PM 
32 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 26:1 
 
consumer protection cases on a similar basis.163 The Court has never 
questioned state legislatures’ ability to pursue this private litigation-
enhancing goal through quasi-punishment in the form of damages over 
and above compensatory judgments. 
What is more, the Court already has taken a step in the realm of 
punitive damages toward broadly deferring to various state interests. In 
BMW of North America v. Gore, the Court started from the premise that 
“the federal excessiveness inquiry appropriately begins with an 
identification of the state interests that a punitive award is designed to 
serve.”164 Yet, because the Alabama Legislature had not enacted any 
legislation allowing or regulating the punitive award there, the Court 
did not have any occasion to consider any state interest beyond the 
generalized notions—which it accepted—that “[p]unitive damages may 
properly be imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in punishing 
unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.”165 
There is no reason to think that the Court would not be equally 
deferential to a state’s desire to accomplish something else through a 
punitive remedy.166 Exxon illustrates how such a situation might arise. 
There, the plaintiffs sought to justify their multi-billion dollar punitive 
award in part on the ground that it provided quasi-compensation for 
certain harms that are not directly actionable under maritime law.167 
Although the quasi-compensatory function of punitive awards has 
 
 163. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 93A, § 11 (2002); TEX. BUS. & COM. 
CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (2002); Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 690 
(Tex. 1980) (finding the Texas Legislature provided for treble damages “so that 
consumers will have incentive to pursue their claims”). 
 164. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Catherine Sharkey makes a similar point in arguing that states have the 
power to re-conceptualize punitive damages as “societal damages” and that, if 
they did, this approach “would seem to survive the retributive-punishment-
focused due process constraints of State Farm.” Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive 
Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L. J. 347, 401 (2003); see also id. at 353–54. 
 167. See Brief for Respondents 61–63, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 
2605 (2008). Punitive awards historically served such a quasi-compensatory 
function. Indeed, “the whole [common law] doctrine of punitory or exemplary 
damages has its foundation in a failure to recognize as elements upon which 
compensation may be given many things which ought to be classed as injuries 
entitling the injured person to compensation.” Stuart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 
66 Tex. 580, 586 (1885); see also Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 
U.S. 424, 437 n.11 (2001); Kenneth Redden, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2 (The Michie 
Co. 1980) (referencing this history). Common law cases are legion in which 
punitive damages were allowed because the defendant’s conduct caused 
injuries, most often mental anguish and inexact consequential harm, for which 
plaintiffs could not recover compensatory damages. See, e.g., Fay v. Parker, 53 
N.H. 342, 382–84 (1872); McNamara v. King, 7 Ill. 432, 436 (1845); Brown v. 
Swinefeld, 44 Wis. 282, 286–89 (1878). 
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largely (though not entirely) disappeared from modern tort systems,168 it 
arguably remains important in maritime law. Through a limitation on 
the doctrine of foreseeability, maritime law forbids tort plaintiffs from 
recovering certain economically remote and all intangible (or 
psychological) injuries that are recoverable in other tort systems.169 The 
upshot of maritime law’s limited availability of compensatory damages 
meant that hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars of harm were 
unaccounted for in the Exxon plaintiffs’ compensatory recoveries.170 
 
 168. See Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 437 n.11 (“[A]s the types of compensatory 
damages available to plaintiffs have broadened” to include such things as pain 
and suffering,” the theory behind punitive damages has shifted toward a more 
purely punitive . . . understanding.” (internal citations omitted)); see also State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (noting that two 
plaintiffs recovered $500,000 each in compensatory damages under Utah tort 
law for emotional distress related to eighteen months of uncertainty over 
whether their insurance claim would be paid). Michigan law continues to 
provide that punitive damages are strictly compensatory in character, their 
purpose being to compensate plaintiffs in cases of malicious or wanton conduct 
for their humiliation, outrage, or indignity. See Veselenak v. Smith, 327 N.W.2d 
261, 264–65 (Mich. 1982); Bailey v. Graves, 309 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Mich. 1969); 
Joba Constr. Co. v. Burns & Roe, Inc., 329 N.W.2d 760, 773 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). 
In Connecticut, the sole purpose of punitive damages remains quasi-
compensatory, although they are intended to compensate plaintiffs for litigation 
expenses, not for intangible or otherwise uncompensable harm. See Triangle 
Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Silver, 222 A.2d 220, 225 (Conn. 1966); DeSantis v. 
Piccadilly Land Corp., 487 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Conn. App. 1985). 
 169. See Robins Dry Dock & Repair v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927); Getty Ref. & 
Mktg. Co. v. MT FADI B, 766 F.2d 829, 833 (3rd Cir. 1985); Louisiana ex rel. 
Guste v. M/V Testabank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1035 (5th Cir. 1985) (Wisdom, J., 
dissenting). 
 170. Commercial fishermen, for instance, were unable to recover for the 
devaluation in their fishing permits to the tune of tens of thousands of dollars 
per permit. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Airport Depot Diner, 120 F.3d 166, 167 n.3 
(9th Cir. 1997); Brief for Amici Curiae of Sociologists, Psychologists, and Law 
and Economics Scholars in Support of Respondents [hereinafter “Social Science 
Amicus Brief”] 5–6. Other fishermen were unable to recover for “price 
diminishment in fisheries that were not oiled” or “diminution of market value 
owing to fear or stigma.” Exxon Shipping, 120 F.3d at 167 n.3. Landowners whose 
land was not oiled were left uncompensated for reductions in their land’s value. 
Id. The tourist industry was unable to recover for the loss of tens of millions in 
revenue when would-be visitors stayed home after the spill. Social Science 
Amicus Brief, at 4–5. Perhaps most significantly, residents across the region were 
unable to recover for any of their profound emotional and psychological harms. 
See In re the Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1094 (D. Alaska 2004) (noting 
that “the social fabric of Prince William Sound and Lower Cook Inlet was torn 
apart,” producing a high incidence of severe depression, post-traumatic stress 
disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder among those whose lives depended 
on harvesting the resources of the Sound”). The spill exacted an especially 
severe psychological toll on Alaska Natives. For these individuals, “subsistence 
fishing is not merely a way to feed their families but an important part of their 
culture.” Id. at 1078. 
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The Court brushed aside the plaintiffs’ argument for quasi-
compensation in a footnote. It refused to consider seriously whether a 
punitive award may serve such purposes because “the jury instructions 
in this case did not allow the jury to set punitive damages on the basis of 
any such consideration.”171 However, it is hard to believe that the Court 
would disallow a considered legislative policy of allowing plaintiffs to 
seek punitive damages as quasi-compensation. While some scholars 
have argued that plaintiffs should not be able to recover money for 
actual harm through punitive damages,172 many law-and-economics 
experts have explained that allowing punitive damages in cases of 
extreme misconduct “can ensure that a wrongdoer bears all the costs of 
its actions, and is thus appropriately deterred from causing harm.”173 
Awarding damages under such circumstances, in other words, can force 
wrongdoers to internalize the full range of consequences of their 
reprehensible conduct, much in the same way that the Michigan law in 
Harmelin sought to force people caught possessing large amounts of 
drugs to account for the full societal consequences of their actions.174 
States likewise should be able to pursue more specifically targeted 
state interests though punitive awards. Again, the facts of Exxon provide 
an apt illustration. In its simplest terms, Exxon was a drunk driving 
case—or, more precisely, a case about a company’s failure to prevent a 
known alcoholic from driving a supertanker. While the Court did not 
dwell on the precise nature of the company’s recklessness, it is 
noteworthy that some of the states that have enacted legislative caps 
suspend them in cases involving intoxication.175 Surely this policy 
decision is worthy of deference. The Supreme Court has stated in other 
contexts—for example, in the course of upholding state laws 
 
 171. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2633 n.27 (2008). The 
pertinent instructions identified the purposes of punitive damages as “to punish 
a wrongdoer for extraordinary misconduct” and “to warn defendants and others 
and to deter them from doing the same.” Id. (quoting jury instruction 21). 
 172. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic 
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 939 (1998). 
 173. Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 243 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, 
J., concurring); see also Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting 
that “punitive damages are necessary . . . to make sure that tortious conduct is 
not underdeterred, as it might be if compensatory damages fell short of the 
actual injury inflicted by the tort”); Thomas Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The 
Efficient Evolution of Punitive Damages, 51 LA. L. REV. 3, 12–13, 48–49 (1990). 
 174. Another way in which a state might seek to allow quasi-compensation, 
as Catherine Sharkey has posited, would be to permit juries to award punitive 
damages payable to the state for “societal compensation.” Sharkey, supra note 
166 at 353–54. Such damages likewise “forc[e] cost internalization” of the full 
consequences of reprehensible conduct. Id. at 354. 
 175. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(f) (2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-
65(3)(d)(ii) (2002); N.J. STAT. 2A:15-5.14(c) (2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-26 (2000). 
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automatically suspending a person’s driver’s license if the driver refuses 
to take a breath-analysis test—that states have a “paramount interest” in 
combating drunken driving.176 If Congress were to enact a maritime law 
allowing heightened punitive awards in cases of intoxication, it is hard 
to imagine the Court disallowing that assessment. 
In the end, the only governmental tactic that may be truly off limits 
if pursued by a legislative strategy would be purposely subjecting 
defendants to unpredictable or randomized punitive awards. One might 
argue that such unpredictability is useful in order to prevent companies 
from conducting cost-benefit analyses regarding the advisability of 
wrongful courses of action.177 But as Justice O’Connor explained in one 
of the Court’s early punitive damages cases: 
[t]he Due Process Clause does not permit a State to classify 
arbitrariness as a virtue. Indeed, the point of due process—of 
the law in general―is to allow citizens to order their behavior. 
A State can have no legitimate interest in deliberately making 
the law so arbitrary that citizens will be unable to avoid 
punishment based solely on bias or whim.178 
3. Establishing Maximum Punishments 
In the criminal sentencing realm, the Court has made clear time 
and again that “[r]eviewing courts . . . should grant substantial 
deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in 
determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes.”179 Indeed, 
 
 176. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979); see also id. at 25 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) (it “cannot be doubted” that this state interest is “significant”); 
Skinner v. Railway Executives Labor Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 620–21 (1989) 
(discussing the government’s strong interest in ensuring safety in transportation 
through deterring the use of alcohol or drugs on duty); South Dakota v. Dole, 
483 U.S. 203, 208–09 (1987) (holding that a congressional provision tying federal 
aid to establishing tough standards for drunk driving was legitimate means of 
promoting safety on nation’s highways). 
 177. See Rustad, supra note 32, at 1349–50 (“[I]t is arguable that capping 
punitive damages cripples the deterrent function of punitive damages because 
the total punitive liability is predictable.”); Amelia J. Toy, Comment, Statutory 
Punitive Damages Caps and the Profit Motive: An Economic Perspective, 40 EMORY L. 
J. 303, 335 (1991) (arguing same). An example of a company performing 
something like this kind of cost-benefit analysis is the notorious Ford Pinto case, 
in which the automobile manufacturer was aware of a safety hazard in its 
vehicles but decided not to fix it on the theory that paying damages in lawsuits 
would be cheaper than fixing the problem. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 
Cal. App. 3d 757 (1981). 
 178. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 59 (1991) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
 179. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983); see also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 
U.S. 263, 274 (1980) (acknowledging “reluctance to review legislatively 
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notwithstanding the Eighth Amendment’s express prohibition against 
“cruel and unusual punishment,”180 the Court has said that “marked 
divergences both in underlying theories of sentencing and in the length 
of prescribed prison terms are the inevitable, often beneficial, result of the 
federal structure.”181 Courts should be so “reluctant to review 
legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment” that “successful 
challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences should be 
exceedingly rare.”182 As long as a state proffers a “reasonable basis for 
believing” that the length of a prison sentence advances legitimate state 
interests, courts should uphold the sentence.183 
Based on these principles, the Supreme Court has found a prison 
sentence substantively excessive exactly once in its history. In Solem v. 
Helm, the Court held that imposing a sentence upon a recidivist offender 
of life without the possibility of parole for uttering a “no account” check 
violated the Eighth Amendment.184 At the same time, the Court has 
upheld a sentence of twenty-five years to life for a “third strike” of 
stealing $399 of merchandise from a golf pro shop;185 a life sentence for a 
third strike of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses;186 a sentence of forty 
years in prison for possession with intent to distribute and distribution 
of nine ounces of marijuana;187 and a life sentence for a first offense of 
possessing 672 grams of cocaine.188 In the more recent of the three strikes 
cases, the Court upheld a sentence that was at least 12.5 times longer 
(due to the defendant’s recidivism) than the state’s maximum 
punishment for the underlying offense189—a measuring stick one might 
 
mandated terms of imprisonment”); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 379 
(1910) (“The function of the legislature is primary, its exercises fortified by 
presumptions of right and legality, and is not to be interfered with lightly, nor 
by any judicial conception of their wisdom or propriety.”). 
 180. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added). 
 181. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in judgment) (emphasis added); see also Solem, 463 U.S. at 
291 n.17 (“The inherent nature of our federal system” may result in “a wide 
range of constitutional sentences.”). 
 182. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 (1982) (per curiam) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 183. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003). 
 184. 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983). 
 185. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 11. 
 186. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 264 (1980). 
 187. Hutto, 454 U.S. at 370. 
 188. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961 (1991). 
 189. The defendant’s third strike in the case was grand theft.  Ewing, 538 U.S. 
at 18. The crime is a “wobbler” under California law, which is punishable either 
as a misdemeanor or as a felony. If treated as a felony, the offense was 
presumptively punishable at the time by two years in prison. CAL. PENAL CODE § 
489(b) (1999). The offense was punishable by three years if any aggravating 
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see as roughly equivalent to a punitive-to-compensatory-damages ratio. 
The Court also has held that once states have statutory mechanisms in 
place for structuring sentencing decisions, state judiciaries need not 
perform any kind of proportionality review―not even in capital cases.190 
To be sure, the Court has taken a less deferential approach to states’ 
determinations respecting which offenders should be subject to capital 
punishment. The Court has disallowed states’ attempts to expand 
capital punishment with respect to crimes against individuals beyond 
cases in which a homicide occurs.191  And even then, it has held that 
states may not impose the death penalty upon individuals who are 
juveniles192 or mentally retarded193 when they commit their offenses. 
But even these decisions—especially the Court’s most recent 
holding in Kennedy v. Louisiana—can be seen as deriving primarily from 
procedural considerations. In Kennedy, the Court held that a state may not 
punish the crime of child rape with the death penalty.194 Applying its 
now-familiar two-step Eighth Amendment analysis, the Court 
determined that (1) the small number of states authorizing such 
punishment indicated a national consensus against it, and (2) the Court’s 
own independent judgment confirmed that capital punishment was 
inappropriate for the crime. The first of these considerations 
demonstrated that the death penalty in this context was random in the 
sense that offenders in the vast majority of states cannot receive it.195 
The second consideration, while commonly characterized (and 
criticized) as hinging on the Court’s own perception of proportionality, 
was grounded in part on a similar concern for consistency. The Court 
noted that even in Louisiana the death penalty had been “most 
infrequent[ly]” imposed for child rape.196 And the Court expressed 
doubt that, in contrast to homicide, it was possible in this context “to 
identify standards that would guide [juries] so the penalty is reserved 
 
factors had been present, see CAL. RULES OF COURT 4.421 (2009), but none besides 
recidivism were. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 40. 
 190. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984). 
 191. E.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2659 (2008) (announcing this 
categorical rule and applying it to crime of rape of a child); Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U.S. 584 (1977) (barring capital punishment for rape of an adult); Eberheart v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (prohibiting capital punishment for aggravated 
kidnapping). I should note here that I represented Patrick Kennedy in the 
United States Supreme Court. 
 192. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 193. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 194. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2641. 
 195. Id. at 2651–52 (noting that only six states subjected child rape to the death 
penalty). 
 196. Id. at 2661. Over twelve years, Louisiana juries returned two death 
sentences for the crime. Id. at 2657. 
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for the most severe cases of child rape and yet not imposed in an 
arbitrary way.”197 Instead of finding that no state reasonably could 
conclude that a heinous instance of child rape should be punished by 
death, Justice Kennedy’s opinion seems to conclude that there is simply 
no way to create any system that would punish the worst child rapes 
with death in any kind of standardized manner. 
It is quite possible that some members of the Kennedy majority cast 
their votes based on a stronger proposition—namely, that someone who 
commits child rape (or any other non-homicidal crime against an 
individual) is just not culpable enough to be punished by death. Yet 
even to the extent that Kennedy rests on this idea, it still is not 
incompatible with the observation that the Court’s capital punishment 
jurisprudence is predominantly non-substantive in nature. Holding that 
an offender must kill someone before being subject to the death penalty 
is equivalent to holding, as the Court has indicated a couple of times, 
that a defendant must act reprehensibly or recklessly in order to be 
subject to punitive damages.198 The holding sets a threshold. Such a 
holding says nothing, however, about the key question of how severely 
defendants may be punished once their conduct crosses that threshold. 
It is not hard to see why the Court has pursued such a 
substantively deferential approach to legislatively prescribed 
punishments that are capable of being implemented consistently. As my 
colleague Pamela Karlan reminded us a few years ago, it is very difficult 
to find any socially acceptable metric for measuring the seriousness of a 
crime in an “absolute” sense.199 People can sometimes agree that certain 
crimes are more serious than others, but empirical studies show that 
they “disagree profoundly” over how severely to punish any given 
crime.200 This disagreement is hardly surprising. Once we move beyond 
“an eye for an eye,” there is no easy way to convert crimes into terms of 
punishment—e.g., to determine whether a crime such as second-degree 
assault should be punished by five or fifteen years in prison. And once 
we move beyond retribution as the exclusive penological goal, it 
becomes even more difficult to translate a criminal conviction into an 
appropriate term of years for the offender.201 So when a legislature steps 
in and attempts to establish a hierarchy of crimes and to assign 
 
 197. Id. at 2660. 
 198. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419; cf. 
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (adopting common law standard of 
recklessness or callous indifference for cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
 199. Karlan, supra note 146, at 894. 
 200. Id. (discussing James Rossi et al., The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative 
Structure and Individual Differences, 39 AM. SOC. REV. 224, 225–26 (1974)). 
 201. Id. at 896. 
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sentencing values to those crimes, the Court is loathe to second-guess 
the result of that policy-laden work. 
All of this reasoning holds at least as true with respect to punitive 
damages. It is challenging at the outset to stratify different kinds of 
corporate wrongdoing. The Court in Exxon asserted that Exxon’s 
conduct was not exceptionally blameworthy in part because its decision 
to leave Hazelwood in command despite knowledge that he was 
drinking aboard ship was not (1) “driven primarily by a desire for gain” 
or (2) derived from a sense that it could hide its misconduct should an 
oil spill occur.202 Yet a legislature might well have reached exactly the 
opposite conclusion—namely, that corporate conduct not even driven 
by a desire for profit (as most if not all corporate decisions are supposed 
to be) and done in complete awareness that it will have to pay for any 
harm that occurs is particularly callous and thus particularly 
reprehensible and in need of deterrence. Certainly, if a legislature 
deemed individuals who kill in cold blood and in the bright of day to be 
worse than those who kill clandestinely in order to achieve some kind of 
gain, one would be hard pressed to categorically disagree. 
It is even more difficult to say that any given level of punitive 
damages would be unreasonable for a legislature to allow.203 If elected 
public officials’ declarations are any indication, virtually the whole state 
of Alaska thought it fair to require Exxon to pay five or even ten times 
the quantified compensatory damages in the case.204 If Congress has 
enacted a law permitting punitive damages of up to five times the 
underlying compensatory damages in maritime cases of corporately 
enabled drunk driving, it is hard to imagine the Court overriding that 
assessment. 
Indeed, three aspects of the punitive damages landscape render 
legislative decisions to allow high awards even more worthy of 
 
 202. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2633 (2008). 
 203. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein et al. at 2078, 2087 (describing the difficulty juries 
have in agreeing on a dollar amount that is appropriate to punish and deter any 
given conduct). Perhaps if a legislature sought to impose a purely quasi-
compensatory approach to punitive damages, one might be able to pronounce 
with some degree of confidence that a given award was too high. But to the 
extent that punishment and other state interests remain in the mix, legislatively 
determined levels of appropriate awards seem highly worthy of respect. 
 204. The State of Alaska filed an amicus brief in the Supreme Court 
supporting the plaintiffs, as did the Alaska Legislative Council (on behalf of the 
Alaska State Legislature), all living former governors of the State, and Senator 
Ted Stevens. Sitting governor Sarah Palin stated on the day the Court’s decision 
was announced that she was “very disappointed” in the Court’s ruling because 
it was “not right” or “fair.” See Governor Sarah Palin’s Reaction to Exxon Valdez 
Decision (CBS television broadcast June 25, 2008), available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5H-26MOxH34 (last visited Feb. 28, 2009). 
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deference than decisions to allow long prison sentences. First, the 
Constitution provides an explicit check against excessive criminal 
punishment (the Eighth Amendment), whereas it contains no such 
provision respecting punitive damages.205 As a matter of constitutional 
structure, therefore, it would be exceedingly strange, all else being 
equal, if courts were supposed to review the severity of criminal 
punishment as rigorously as—let alone less rigorously than—the 
amount of punitive awards.206 
Second, and relatedly, it is worth remembering that criminal 
sentences involve removing people from their families and putting them 
behind bars for years on end or even killing them. Punitive damages 
involve forcing a person or entity (usually a corporation) to pay money. 
It does not belittle the significance of the latter to observe that the former 
is more serious and deserves closer judicial scrutiny. Just ask an 
independent businessperson whether she would rather spend years in 
prison or dole out a large chunk of her corporation’s cash reserves. 
Third, legislative determinations concerning criminal punishment 
are more likely to be unduly harsh than those concerning punitive 
damages. Criminal defendants, as John Hart Ely might observe in this 
situation,207 are hardly a powerful or popular constituency. And 
legislators “face powerful political pressures” (from the public, from 
prosecutors, and sometimes from victim advocacy groups) that 
encourage them continuously to “ratchet up sentences.”208 Corporations, 
by contrast, typically have at least some advocates in a legislature. 
Accordingly, one would expect corporations to be much more able to 
achieve temperance in punitive damages legislation.209 Judicial scrutiny 
of harsh punitive awards should be less necessary than with respect to 
long prison sentences. 
Nothing in current case law contradicts any of these postulates. The 
Supreme Court has never invalidated a legislatively authorized punitive 
award or any other kind of judgment involving enhanced damages on 
 
 205. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text (noting that the Eighth 
Amendment does not apply to punitive damages). 
 206. The same is true with respect to common law and constitutional history, 
which traditionally have applied a more robust proportionality principle to 
criminal punishment than to punitive damages. Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 
1064–65. 
 207. See John Ely, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (Harvard University Press 1980). 
 208. Karlan, supra note 146, at 890; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 566 
(2005) (noting “the general popularity of anticrime legislation”); William J. 
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 531–33 
(2001); Nancy E. Marion, Symbolic Policies in Clinton’s Crime Control Agenda, 1 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 67, 103 (1997). 
 209. See supra notes  151–152 and accompanying text. 
FISHER_FMT6.DOC 5/1/2009  4:29:14 PM 
2009 THE EXXON VALDEZ CASE 41 
 
the ground that the damages were too high.210 Nor has it even expressed 
the slightest interest in doing so. When the Court in Exxon surveyed 
various kinds of legislatively-created punitive and enhanced damages 
regimes, the Court took as a given the legitimacy of state statutes 
allowing ratios of up to five times compensatory damages or treble 
damages regimes under antitrust, RICO, and patent law.211 It did so 
despite that fact that it is hard to say that a bland antitrust violation 
(which carries a mandatory two-to-one ratio and could result in an 
award in the hundreds of millions or billions of dollars212) is worse than 
Exxon’s conduct leading to the Exxon Valdez oil spill. 
To be sure, the Court has suggested that the Due Process Clause 
establishes a one-to-one ratio limit in certain cases involving substantial 
harm.213 But it is one thing to say that such a ratio should be a default 
rule—that is, the presumptive limit in the absence of legislation covering 
the conduct at issue.  It would be wholly another thing to enforce such a 
one-to-one principle in the face of a considered legislative judgment to 
the contrary. Doing so would require the Court to swing a wrecking ball 
not just against numerous state laws allowing punitive awards bearing 
higher ratios but also against federal antitrust, RICO, and dozens of 
other regimes allowing treble damages or higher in cases involving 
substantial harm.214 Such judicial action would summon distinct and 
uncomfortable echoes of Lochner’s era of “economic substantive due 
process.” 
Assuming the Court is uninterested or at least unwilling to go 
there, the question remains how detailed legislative regulation of 
punitive damages must be in order to trigger the kind of judicial 
deference that exists respecting criminal sentences. The nature of 
criminal sentencing law suggests that a legislature need only enact some 
kind of cap for punitive damages in tort cases. That might be enough, 
particularly if the cap is a low, single-digit ratio. But it is easy to forget 
that even when criminal statutes do nothing more than establish 
maximum sentences, they peg those sentences to fairly particular kinds 
of conduct (robbery, kidnapping, etc.). Tort systems, by contrast, cover a 
wide range of disparate conduct—from assault to trespassing to 
defamation to interference with business expectancies. Thus, legislatures 
 
 210. The three punitive awards the Court has invalidated―in BMW, State 
Farm, and Exxon―all came out of purely common law regimes. 
 211. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2631–32 (2008). 
 212. See, e.g., Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 795 (6th Cir. 
2002) (upholding $1.05 billion award). 
 213. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2634 n.28. 
 214. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text (listing federal statutes 
providing for punitive damages in excess of a one-to-one ratio). 
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interested in allowing punitive damages above low, single-digit levels—
and I see no reason why such a goal would be impermissible—would do 
well to specify maximum ratios with respect to more finely grained 
categories of misconduct. 
Furthermore, just as in criminal law, one can imagine various kinds 
of aggravating or mitigating factors that could apply across categories of 
tortious conduct. A defendant’s behavior might involve special levels of 
malice, it might cause severe collateral harm, or it might be less in need 
of deterrence because of other kinds of punishment already imposed. 
Accordingly, legislatures would do well to provide lists of aggravating 
and mitigating factors to guide juries respecting permissible amounts of 
punitive damages and to require juries to find aggravating factors before 
imposing punitive damages above otherwise presumptive thresholds.215 
If capital sentencing jurisprudence is any guide, such aggravating 
factors need not be terribly precise or narrow. The Court has held that 
aggravating factors, such as having prior convictions, committing a 
“cold-blooded” act, and inflicting mental anguish adequately narrow 
the class of death-eligible offenders.216 
Alaska law, ironically enough, already follows such a model. It 
provides that punitive damages generally may not exceed the greater of 
a three-to-one ratio or $500,000.217 Yet if corporate policymakers were 
aware of the adverse consequences of the misconduct or if the 
defendant’s action was motivated by financial gain, then the Alaska cap 
on punitive damages rises to the greater of a four-to-one ratio, four 
times the attempted or achieved financial gain, or $7 million.218 Florida 
law contains a similar hierarchy, and adds that no cap exists when the 
defendant acted with a specific intent to harm the plaintiff.219 
These state laws, however, only scratch the surface of what a 
jurisdiction might do. If Congress or a state legislature believes that the 
availability of large punitive damages awards in appropriate cases is an 
 
 215. This raises an interesting question as to whether the Seventh 
Amendment, like the Sixth Amendment, would require juries to find 
aggravating factors allowing higher punitive awards than are otherwise 
allowed. Cf. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that Sixth 
Amendment requires aggravating factors, other than the fact of a prior 
conviction, to be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt). At 
the very least, it seems like a good idea to require juries to find such necessary 
facts. 
 216. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 593 (2002) (providing the aggravating 
factors under Arizona law); Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973–74 (1994) 
(cataloging decisions upholding various states’ aggravating factors). 
 217. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(f) (2008). 
 218. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(g) (2008). 
 219. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1) (2005). For another similar hierarchy, see GA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 51-12-5.1(f) & (g) (2000). 
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important means of furthering some governmental interest, it could 
enact a set of guidelines much like some states’ criminal sentencing 
guidelines.220 Or a legislature could enact a whole “punitive damages 
reform act.” Once it did, it is extremely difficult to imagine the Supreme 
Court invoking the Constitution to declare any particular award 
substantively excessive. 
B. Criminal Sentencing 
The Supreme Court’s merging of punitive damages jurisprudence 
with criminal sentencing jurisprudence may also have a significant effect 
on certain sentencing systems. Though it is often forgotten in light of the 
academic focus on the evolving and lately dramatic story of federal 
sentencing (and to a lesser extent on the recent movement in many states 
toward various forms of guideline or presumptive sentencing), many 
states in the country still follow a general model of granting unfettered 
sentencing discretion within widely prescribed sentencing ranges. These 
systems resemble the common law system of awarding punitive 
damages and effectively retain all of the vices of the old federal system 
that the Court decried in Exxon. 
The states that follow a criminal sentencing model that most closely 
resembles the common law method of assessing punitive damages are 
the six states that provide for jury sentencing.221 While there is some 
variation among these systems, the systems generally allow juries 
unfettered discretion to select sentences for felonies within broad 
sentencing ranges. In Virginia, for example, rape is punishable by 
between five years and life.222 With respect to crimes that do not carry 
specific ranges, class two felonies are punishable by between twenty 
years and life; class three felonies are punishable by between five and 
twenty years; class four felonies are punishable by between two and ten 
years; and class five felonies are punishable by between one and ten 
 
 220. This notion was first advanced in Sunstein et al., supra note 11, at 2113, 
2125; see also Jenny Miao Jiang, Comment, Whimsical Punishment: The Vice of 
Federal Intervention, Constitutionalization, and Substantive Due Process in Punitive 
Damages Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 793, 813–24 (2006) (advocating creation of punitive 
damages guideline system mirroring Federal Sentencing Guidelines). No 
legislature has yet picked up the idea, perhaps in part because none thus far has 
realized how much substantive flexibility it would have if it did so. 
 221. The six states are Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas and 
Virginia. Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A 
Three-State Study, 57 VAND. L. REV. 885, 886 (2004). 
 222. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-6(B) (2004). 
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years.223 Virginia and two other states have adopted sentencing 
guidelines to assist judges when sentencing within these wide ranges 
following bench trials and guilty pleas, but, curiously enough, forbid 
juries from being given this information when imposing sentences 
following jury trials.224 The three other states that allow jury sentencing 
likewise give juries no instructions or guidance regarding average or 
typical sentences for like offenders.225 
Although precious little in the way of systematic, empirical 
research has been done respecting the output of these systems, the 
(predictable) result appears to be a high degree of variation of sentences 
for similarly situated offenders.226 In Virginia, less than one-third of jury 
sentences fall within the guidelines recommendations given to judges.227 
In a study involving one Texas county, judges related “copious evidence 
of unjustified disparity in jury sentences.”228 For instance, one Texas 
judge described a gang rape that gave rise to several separate trials. The 
juries gave the defendants sentences ranging from a two-year 
suspended sentence to a forty-year prison term for the one who 
appeared to be the least culpable.229 
It requires little reflection to see the strong resemblance between 
this situation and the state of affairs that has given rise to the Supreme 
Court’s due process jurisprudence regulating punitive damages. 
Existing legislation is sparse and does not seriously regularize 
 
 223. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10(a–e) (2004). Other states have similarly broad 
ranges. E.g. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-401(a) (2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.060(2) 
(2006). 
 224. King & Noble, supra note 221, at 888–89; Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. 
Noble, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: Comparing Severity and Variance in Two 
States, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 331, 337 (2005); See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-
90-803–04 (2006); Stephanie Gardner Holder, Survey: Criminal Procedure, 16 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 99 (1994); Robert S. Dierker, 32 MISSOURI PRACTICE: 
MISSOURI CRIMINAL LAW § 58.8 (2008 update). Based on interviews with judges, 
prosecutors, and defense lawyers, King and Noble speculate that these states 
may leave juries “in the dark,” in part, to introduce greater variability and 
severity into jury sentencing, and thereby to encourage plea bargains. To the 
extent that is so, such systems raise an even more serious due process question 
than I pose above. See supra notes 178, 179 and accompanying text (describing 
Court’s punitive damages law forbidding the introduction of arbitrariness in the 
system for deterrent purposes). 
 225. Those states are Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Texas. King & Noble, supra 
note 221, at 888–89. 
 226. King & Noble, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases, supra note 224, at 351–
57 (reciting findings from a study of jury sentences in Virginia and Arkansas); 
Robert A. Weninger, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: A Case Study of El Paso 
County, Texas, 45 WASH. UNIV. J. OF URBAN & CONTEMP. LAW. 3, 28–29, 32 (1994). 
 227. King & Noble, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases, supra note 224, at 354. 
 228. Weninger, supra note 226, at 28. 
 229. Id. at 29. 
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punishment. Sentences are starkly unpredictable. And defendants 
occasionally receive large, outlier sentences without any apparent 
explanation. Such defendants, therefore, appear to have a strong 
argument that their sentences violate the Due Process Clause and thus 
should be reduced. The same appears true for defendants who receive 
unusually harsh sentences in states—and there appear to be at least two 
and perhaps as many as three dozen such states—that afford judges the 
same kind of unfettered discretion.230 
To be sure, state systems that allow wide sentencing discretion 
contain some features that differentiate them from the common law 
system of awarding punitive damages. Most notably, the criminal 
statutes always prescribe a maximum sentence, even if it is death or a 
prison term of life. Criminal trials in states involve publicly accountable 
prosecutors, who may not urge judges and juries to impose maximum 
possible punishments as often as plaintiffs’ lawyers do.231 Criminal 
sentencing law also contains unique post-adjudication components that 
may smooth out unjustified disparities to some degree. Parole boards 
are commonly entrusted with the power to release prisoners once they 
have served portions of indeterminate sentences. Clemency boards and 
state governors likewise have the power—even if very rarely invoked—
to mitigate the severity of outlier sentences. Any serious due process 
attack on long sentences imposed in indeterminate sentencing systems 
would need to account for these, and other, realities. 
My purpose, here, however, is simply to point out that it should be 
hard for the Court to avoid applying its new regularization 
jurisprudence in the context of a well-framed attack on unstructured 
state sentencing systems. Tens of thousands of offenders per year are 
sentenced under these kinds of sentencing systems, and their liberty 
 
 230. See Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 1996 National Survey of 
State Sentencing Structures 3–6 (classifying 36 states as having “predominately 
indeterminate sentencing structure[s],” which tend to allow wide discretion in 
sentencing); Jon Wool & Don Stemen, Aggravated Sentencing: Blakely v. 
Washington: Practical Implications for State Sentencing Systems, at 3 (Vera Institute 
of Justice State Sentencing and Corrections Policy and Practice Review, Aug. 
2004) (listing thirteen states as restricting judicial discretion through binding 
guidelines and twelve others as having advisory or voluntary guidelines, 
leaving the other twenty-five as purely discretionary systems). It appears that no 
one has done any recent study to measure variability and sentencing disparities 
in such a system. The closest thing to such a study appears to be the national 
statistics compiled across jurisdictions that are mentioned in John F. Pfaff, The 
Continued Vitality of Structured Sentencing After Blakely: The Effectiveness of 
Voluntary Guidelines, 54 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 235 (2006). Obviously, if my analysis 
here is right, studies documenting the variability of noncapital prison sentences 
in states could become extraordinarily important. 
 231. See Karlan, supra note 139, at 919. 
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surely matters as much as corporations’ pocket books. To the extent the 
Due Process Clause has not been brought to bear on these sentencing 
systems because solid, statistical evidence documenting unpredictability 
does not exist—or, even worse, because members of the Supreme Court 
and the relevant state judiciaries are unaware of the parallels between 
these systems and the common law system for imposing punitive 
damages—that should change. If the mission of the Due Process Clause 
is now seriously to regularize punishment, there is no reason why that 
mission should be limited to civil cases.232 
CONCLUSION 
Although the substantive outcome of Exxon suggests at first glance 
that the Supreme Court’s constitutional punitive damages jurisprudence 
may be poised to become quite substantive and muscular, a more careful 
reading—coupled with a comparison to criminal sentencing 
proportionality jurisprudence—suggests just the opposite. The Court is 
concerned with the unpredictability of punitive damage awards, not 
with their amounts per se. Exxon thus sets the stage for the Court’s 
punitive damages jurisprudence to be confined almost exclusively to the 
realm of procedural due process. The decision leaves it to Congress and 
state legislatures to ratify the possibility of imposing large punitive 
awards in appropriate cases and plants the seeds of affording extreme, if 
not absolute, deference to such democratic determinations. 
At the same time, Exxon sets the stage for a potential upheaval of 
many states’ systems of imposing criminal punishment. Although the 
Court has long held that it will defer to state legislatures’ determinations 
concerning the permissible length of prison sentences, Exxon indicates 
that the Court—that is, the Due Process Clause—will no longer tolerate 
wide and unjustified disparities concerning which individuals receive 
unusually long sentences. It may be an ironic legacy of the Exxon Valdez 
litigation that the largest corporation in the world, in a one-of-a-kind 
federal case, litigated to establish a legal principle that brings long-
overdue constitutional oversight to harsh sentences that state courts 
sometimes impose upon utterly typical and unremarkable criminal 
defendants. 
 
 232. Such claims of arbitrariness or gross disproportionality, of course, could 
also be cast as Eighth Amendment claims. In this respect, a defendant would 
basically be arguing that his sentence is cruel and unusual as measured against 
other similarly situated offenders in the same state. It also remains open to states 
faced with such claims to clamp down on unpredictability by means of state 
common law, mirroring the Supreme Court’s decision to ground the Exxon 
decision in federal maritime law, a species of federal common law. 
